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~ ~No. 78-432-CFX ~-~ Cert to CA 5 (Gee & Fay; 
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA ~ • 
Wisdom, dissenting) 
7k._..6lc__ ~~ ~ ~~ 
v. ~ ~
WEBER, et al. Federal/Civil Timely by extension 
. No.78-435-CFX k ?v~~~~ 
KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL CORP. 1 - Same 
,m~~~~~ 
v. ~I.e_. ~-,1-o 
WEBER, e t a 1. Same -1--r...::> Same 
~~G--":;~~ L-~~..LL.....r--<...v).-11!.--' 
,; 
No. 78-436-CFX /_f~ ~~~~~~ ~ 
UNITED STATES OF -AMERICA & THE EQUAL Same ~ ~h h_~ -~ ---,_ 
~MPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ~
' v. 
WEBER, et al. Same f ~ r...t ~ sa;;;eQ.:Q7 
SUMMARY. These curve-lined cases present the question whether 
a private employer voluntarily may agree with a union to adopt a 
~
program to increase the number of minority employees in skilled craft 
units in the employer's plants even though the employer had not pre-
viously discriminated against mi~ority employe~s. CA 5 held that 
such a program violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (d), on the ground that in the absence of 
a showing that the employer previously discriminated against the 
minority employees such a program constituted impermissible discrimina-
tion against non-minority employees. 
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW. In 1974 petr Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical 
Corp. ("Kaiser") and petr United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, 
("USWA"), entered into a collective bargaining agreement relating to 
eligibility for on-the-job training to enter craft positions at Kaiser's 
plants across the country. In an effort to increase the number of 
minority craft workers the agreement removed the previous requirement 
for craft experience prior to on-the-job training!~~ est~~lished 
that for every white person given such training one minority person 
would be given craft training . until the percentage of minority craft 
rs at a given plant equaled the percentage of minority population in 
the surrounding area. Eligibility for craft training continued to rest 
upon seniority~ but to effectuate the minority -'1iring goals the agree-
ment established dual / seniority lists so that for each two craft unit 
vacancies one trainee would be selected from the list of eligible white 
employees and one from the list of eligible minority employees. This 
resulted in minority employees being admitted to Kaiser's training 
( programs ahead of white employees who had greater seniority than those 
..........,____------ - . ~-----~ 
minority employees. 
Resp Weber is a white employee of Kaiser who unsuccessfully sought 
admission to a craft training program at Kaiser's plant in Gramercy, 
Louisiana. After minority employees who enjoyed less seniority than 
Weber and other white employees were admitted to training programs at 
the Gramerc1y plant ahead of Weber and the other white workers, Weber 
brought suit in the ED La. (Gordon, DJ) on his own hehalf and the behalf 
of the non-minority employees at the Gramercy plant who were eligible 
to apply for on-the-job craft training after the adoption of the 
affirmative action agreement. The suit, brought against petrs Kaiser 
and USWA, alleged that the agreement established a quota plan that 
impermissibly discriminated against non-minority employees in violation 
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) & (d), §§ 703 (a) & (d) of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After a trial on resps' request for 
a permanent injunction restraining petrs from enforcing the affirmative 
action agreement the DC found that the evidence introduced at trial 
showed that Kaiser and USWA had agreed upon a minority goal of 39% 
of the craft force at Gramercy. This figure was based on the desire 
of petrs to raise the minority percentage at the plant, which stood 
at 14.8% of the total force, to a level near the 40% minority p6pulation 
of the parishes surrounding the Gramercy works. The DC found that the 
evidence established that Kaiser had not discriminated against minority 
applicants for employment since the Gramercy plant had opened in 1958 
/ 
and that since 1969 the company had hired new employees on a "one 
white, one black" basis. Moreover, the DC found that though the 
percentage of minority workers in the cra'ft force was only 2-2 1/2% 
prior to 1974 1 Kaiser had made vigorous efforts to secure trained 
minority employees for the craft units until the adoption of the 
agreement here at issue. The DC also found that the 1974 agreement 
had its intended effect at Gramercy of admitting minority em-
ployees to craft training programs who possessed less seniority than 
white employees who sought admission to the same programs. 
The DC stated that the 1974 agreement had been adopted not only 
on account of the desire of Kaiser to increase the percentage of 
skilled minority employees but also out of the company's concern 
about compliance with the regulations issued by the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance ("OFCC"), an agency of the Executive branch of 
the U.S. government. The DC stated also that there was no evidence 
that Kaiser had adopted the 1974 agreement in order to correct any 
ef~ects of past discrimination in any of its plants. To the contrary, 
the DC found that none of the employees who had been offered training 
opportunities over more senior white employees under the 1974 agreement 
had been discriminated against by Kaiser. 
On the basis of these findings the DC held the 1974 agreement L9-~ 
to extend preferential treatment solely on the basis of - ~ r~fil race
to be in violation of Title VII. It rejected Kaiser's 
argument that voluntary plans such as the one here at issue were 
permissible since the federal courts frequently had imposed similar 
plans to effectuate the purposes of Title VII. Though the DC recog-
nized the power of the federal courts to fashion affirmative action 
programs in the proper circumstances it held this did not warrant 
similar voluntary action since, while Title VII forbade discrimination 
by employers, it did not prohibit the courts from discriminating 
against employees in fashioning appropriate remedies. Moreover, the 
DC stated, the courts alone were in the position to fashion remedies 
tailored to the specifics of each situation and designed to protect 
the rights of all parties involved. And only the courts properly could 
administer such remedies to protect the rights of the parties while 
effectuating the purposes of the Act. 
Second, the DC held that even if petrs were correct in arguing 
that employers could discriminate on the basis of race in some cir-
cumstances, such discrimination was improper here since there had been 
no showing of past discrimination against the minority employees here 
involved by the defendants here involved. Because the DC found the 
evidence to have established that the minority employees who benefitted 
from the 1974 agreement had never themselves been the victims of dis-
crimination during hiring it held that any plan--court-ordered or voluntary-
-that adopted other than a plant-wide seniority system violated Title 
VII. Accordingly, the DC permanently enjoined enforcement of the 1974 
agreement at Kaise~'s Gramercy plant. 
CA 5 affirmed, Judge Wisdom dissenting. The CA disagreed with 
~
the DC's view that only the courts could fashion affirmative action 
remedie~ finding that voluntary compliance was an integral part 
of Title VII's enforcement scheme. It did not find it necessary to 
__ ,I P 
explore this question, however, since it aJ!irmed the ~C's judgment 
r · solely on the ground that no showing of past discrimination had been 
....._ _ '"'-.......-.....---.._------------·- ··-----
made. In the absence of such proof, the CA stated, a racial quota -
loses its character as an equitable remedy and became unlawful as 
a racial preference prohibited by Title VII. Nor did the CA find 
that the 1974 agreement was justifiable as an attempt to correct 
past societal discrimination, as opposed to employment discrimination. 
Here, the court held, all of the applicants for training were 
unskilled. Since there had been no discrimination in hiring there 
the 
was no basis to find that/agreement was designed to remedy discrimina-
tion that had occurred outside the plant. Only the effect of seniority 
ms at issue. "Where admissions to the craft on-the-job training pro-
grams are admittedly and purely functions of seniority and that senior-
ity is untainted by prior discriminatory acts," the CA wrote, "the one~ 
fo!-one ratio~ whether designed by agreement between Kaiser and USWA 
or by order of court, has no foundation in restorative justice, and its 
preference for training minority workers thus violates Title VII." Petn 
in No. 78-432, at 36a. 
CA 5 then considered the effect of Executive Order 11246, which 
------------------------------
requires all applicants for federal contracts to refrain from employ--."" ____.......__. __ _
ment discrimination and to take affirmative action to ensure that all 
persons are employed and treated without regard to race. The CA found 
' that to the extent this order authorized any affirmative action programs 
proscribed by Title VII the order was invalid in light of direct congres-
sional prohibition on racial quotas contained in Title VII. 
Judge Wisdom dissented. First, he argued that the majority, by re-
quiring proof of past discrimination, 
that a court could not have imposed. 
had proscribed any voluntary plan 
complianc 
This standard would deter_-.voluntary; 
since employers could not be expected to take the risk of guessing 
how a particular court would come out in any given situation. Judge 
Wisdom instead argued that "[i]f an affirmative action plan, adopted 
in a collective bargaining agreement, is a reasonable remedy for an 
arguable violation of Title VII, it should be upheld." Petn in No. 
78-432, at 45a-46a. Application of this standard in this case, he 
reasoned, would have resulted in reversal. There were at ~ast three 
-
arguable violations of Title VII revealed by the record, he argued. 
First, the statistical evidence showing that only 14.8% of Kaiser's 
work force was black while the surrounding parishes were nearly 40% 
black established a prima facie case of discrimination that was not 
rebutted. Second, the requirement that employees have prior crafts 
experience to enter the training programs may have violated Title VII 
if the employer could not have established a business necessity defense. 
Third, the requirement of training for any craft job conceivably was 
impermissible, at least in the absence of any proffered justification 
for the requirement. Moreover, Judge Wisdom would have found the 
1974 agreement reasonable on the grounds it was adopted by a union 
with a duty of fair representation to its membership, most of which 
is white; it had only limited impact on white workers since none lost 
their positions and none previously eligible for craft training were 
affected by the agreement; and it allowed significant white parti-
cipation • 
Second, Judge Wisdom argued that reversal was required on the 
' 
ground that the 1974 agreement was a proper response to societal 
discrimination. He asserted that employers should not be deterred 
from volunteering to prefer employees who, for whatever 
reasons, had faced discrimination. And he stated that since discrimina-
tion against blacks had been so egregious and recent in the crafts 
it was permissible to adopt such preferences on a racial basis 
so long as the preferences were reasonable. 
Third, Judge Wisdom contended that a basis for upholding the 1974 
agreement was that it complied with Executive Order 11246. Even if 
Title VII prohibited petrs' plan, Judge Wisdom reasoned, C0 ngress 
had indicated that it viewed affirmative action plans as permissible 
under E.O. 11246 regardless of the provisions of Title VII when it 
rejected attempts to transfer enforcement of that order to the EEOC 
and rejected a proposal to amend Title VII to state expressly that 
E.O. 11246 could not be used as authority for affirmative action programs . 
---- Because the DC had not considered this issue in its opinion, however, 
Judge Wisdom would have remanded on this point for further proceedings 
with regard to the relation between the 1974 agreement and E.O. 11246. 
CONTENTIONS. In No. 78-432, USWA urges the Court to grant re-
open 
view to settle the important issue--left 1 in McDonald v. Santa Fe 
Trail Transp: Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281 n.8 (1976)--of whether voluntary 
affirmative actions programs such as the one here at issue are permissible 
Petr USWA argues that the judgment of CA 5 in this case has placed in 
jeopardy a number of such programs around the country in a variety of 
industries. The affirmative action agreements negotiated by USWA 
alone, it argues, affect nearly a million employees ~n majQr sectors 
of the economy. Indeed, petr points out, the affirmative action 
program established by consent decree in the basic steel industry 
in United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F.2d 826 
(CA 5 1975), is being reexamined by the DC in which the consent decree 
was entered in light of the judgment herein. Petr USWA also notes 
that the question here presented was not resolved by the Court in 
( Regents of the U. of Calif.v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978). 
involved action by a public entity and so implicated constitutional 
That case 
concerns not here at issue and involved also Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, a provision not here applicable. Nor will resolu-
tion of the issues presented in County of Los Angeles v. Davis, No. 
77-1553, cert. granted June 19, 1978, affect the issues here presented, 
petr says. Davis involves the imposition of quotas by a court, not the 
voluntary adoption of quotas by private parties. 
Kaiser has filed a petn for cert in No. 78-435. It argues that, 
as Judge Wisdom realized, the judgment of CA 5 will put an end to 
voluntary compliance with affirmative action mandates of Title VII 
and E.O. 11246. Kaiser believes that the racial preferences incorpora-
ted into its 1974 agreement are indispensable to ending the exclusion 
of minority workers from the crafts jobs here at issue and that judicial 
resources are insufficient to allow the courts effectively to police 
tqe ending of discrimination in this area in every industry. Kaiser 
notes that few employers will be willing to admit past discrimination 
in light of the liability to which such admissions could expose them, 
but that CA 5's holding makes such an admission a prerequisite to the 
establishment of a valid voluntary affirmative action system. More-
over, Kaiser argues, the 1974 agreement is consistent with the views 
of a majority of this Court as expressed in Bakke in that the racial 
classification can be justified as necessary to effectuate the interest 
in insuring against discrimination and the interest in assuring that 
all available segments of the labor pool are utilized. This latter 
interest, Kaiser believes, is comparable to the school's interest 
in maintaining a diverse student body recognized in Bakke. 
Kaiser also contends that CA 5's decision conflicts with the 
judgment of CA 8 in Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 (1971)(in 
bane), cert denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). In that case, Kaiser believes, 
CA 8 held that .Title VII did not necessarily require proof that the 
minority persons to whom preferential treatment was to be afforded 
had been the victims of discrimination. Similarly, in EEOC v. AT&T, 
556 F.2d 167 (CA 3 1977), cert. denied, 46 USLW 3803 (1978), CA 3 
found that E.O. 11246 was sufficient in and of itself to justify 
class-wide relief rather than only relief directed at individual victims 
of discrimination, while in this case CA 5 took a narrower view of 
the executive order's scope. Moreover, at least three CAs * have adopted 
the view that E.O. 11246 allows the establishment of affirmative action 
programs in the absence of any findings that the specific employers at 
* Southern Ill. Bldrs. Assoc v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (CA 7 1972); 
Assoc. General Contractors, Inc. v. Altschuler, 490 F.2d 9 (CA 1 1973), 
cert denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvani 
v. Schultz, 442 F.2d 159 (CA 3), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
issue ever discriminated against minority employees. Rather, those 
courts, argues Kaiser, looked to the fact that minorities were substan-
tially underrepresented among the skilled workers hired by the employers 
and that such underrepresentation resulted from the historical exclu-
sion of minority workers from the building trades. Under the view 
adopted by these courts, Kaiser asserts, the 1974 agreement would have 
been upheld. 
I 
The United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
both represented by the SG, have filed the petn in No. 78-436. The 
SG argues that the judgment below will end voluntary compliance since 
no employer will admit Title VII violations in -order to institute an 
affirmative action program. He claims that Title VII permits affirma-
tive action programs 
~
-----------.__ - - -- - ' 
by an employer and a union that have 
a reasonable basis to believe that a plaintiff could establish a prima 
facie case of employment discrimination with respect to the plant in 
question. Such a test would be consonant with the emphasis placed on 
voluntary compliance by Congress, the SG says, and would avoid the 
expense, delay, and rancor often associated with employment litigation. 
In this case, the SG continues, there was ample evidence upon which 
petrs Kaiser and USWA could have believed that a plaintiff might 
have succeeded in a Title VII action. Given the limited scope of 
the 1974 agreement and its slight impact on non-minority employees, 
the SG believes it was a reasonable response to the situation. More-
over, the SG states, E.O. 11246 imposed an affirmative action obliga-
tion on petrs that support the 1974 agreement's lawfulness. As Judge 
7? 
Wisdom noted in his dissent, the SG points out, the legislative history 
of Title VII indicates that Congress did not mean to restrict the 
ability of employers to comply with the mandate of E.O. 11246. 
The DC here found that Kaiser instituted the 1974 agreement largely 
out of concern with the regulations issued by the OFCC under the 
order. Since it is not €lear from the record whether the 19 7'.4 agree-
ment is consistent with E.O. 11246, however, the SG urges that this 
question be referred to the DC on remand. 
The SG then asserts that though he believes the judgment below 
~ to be erroneous, and ordinarily_ would warrant review by the Court, 
the case should be GVR'd for reconsideration in li E!_9f BAkke. 
~ 
Bakke's -
discussion of Title VII and of the kind of factual showings that are 
relevant to cases such as this one would, the SG says, enable the 
CA to dispose of the case on narrower grounds. The SG notes in this 
regard that the record as it now stands does not reveal the actions 
of the OFCC in 1971 and 1973 with regard to Kaiser's on-the-job training 
programs. Since Bakke teaches that the ~egality of an affirmative action 
program may turn on the presence o£ government findings and government 
~rticipation, the SG argues, the record should be reopened on remand 
for a determination of whether a government body charged with responsi-
bility in the area of discrimination made findings of past discrimination : 
Remand would also permit one of the parties or perhaps an intervener 
to prove prior discrimination against blacks at the plant at Gramercy. 
Accordingly, the SG urges the Court to GVR because of the importance and 
relevance of Bakke and the need to supplement the record. 
* The SG has lodged with the Clerk OFCC documents that he believes sup-
port his thesis that petrs undertook the 1974 in reaction to OFCC proddin 
Resp Weber has filed one response in answer to the three petns. 
He urges the Court to deny cert. on the ground that · the judgment below 
is consistent with the express meaning of Title VII and with the 
decisions of this Court holding that Title VII was "designed to make 
race irrelevant in the employment market." City of Los Angeles, Dept. 
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 1376 (1978). Second, 
he.argues that the judgment below is consistent with the decision of 
this Court in Bakke since the factors tending to support the program 
·-~ w~ 7 
~~ · upheld in Bakke are not present here. Third, resp argues that the 
' 
Court should allow the law in this area to develop in light of Bakke 
before deciding another decision in this area. 
If the Court does decide to grant cert., resp urges it to con-
fine itself to the only question presented by the judgment below, i.e., 
) 
the propriety of a voluntary plan in the absence of any proof of past 
discrimination. The SG's request for a remand is unwarranted, resp 
argues. First, there is no need for the DC to consider the effect of 
E.O. 11246 since if the 1974 agreement violates Title VII, the fact 
that the agreement complies with the order is irrelevant. Second, 
there is no need for reconsideration in light of Bakke. Bakke decided 
no new prinicples of law relevant to this case. And, resps says, it 
is clear that petrs formulated their 1974 plan to avoid government in-
volvement, not because of it. There is no evidence justifying a remand 
to determine the extent of government involvement in the adoption of 
the agreement, says resp, and the documents lodged by the SG with the 
Court do not establish to the contrary. 
Petr USWA has filed a Memorandum in opposition to the ~u·s requesc 
for a GVR. USWA argues that the record fairly and adequately presents 
the question whether the 1974 voluntary agreement is permissible in 
the absence of any proof of past discrimination. It a~gues that the 
SG seeks to convert the case on remand into one dealing with the issue 
of the government's power to compel affirmative action remedies upon 
a prima facie showing of past discrimination. That issue is not fairly 
before the Court, petr states, and it urges the Court to reach the 
question decided by CA 5 which is. 
• 
Two briefs amicus curiae have been filed supporting petrs, one by 
one 
the Equal Employment Advisory C0 uncil, an employers' group, and /by the 
Affirmative Action Coordinating Center and a number of civil rights or-
ganizations. 
DISCUSSION. The judgment below clearly raises questions of 
importanc.e concerning the scope of voluntary affirmative action 
programs. Given the importance attached to voluntary compliance 
with the Civil Rights Act by Congress, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974), the -judgment below may have gone too 
far. Petrs' argument that few companies will run the risk of admiting 
. --~---------------------------
past discrimination in order to establish an affirmative action plan 
~ since such admissions would expose them to liability under Title VII 
seems sound. Moreover, any employer that did admit past discrimination 
would also run the risk of suits by non-minority employees claiming 
that there had been no past discrimination sufficient to support the 
establishment ef a racial preference program. Further, the affirmative 
action plan here at issue was limited in scope and in its effect on 
white employees. Moreover, it was negotiated by a union with a· majority 
of white members. In light of these factors, CAS's judgment appears 
unduly restrictive of This Court has not considered 
the permissible scope of voluntary plans under Title ·vii instituted by 
private employers and this case therefore may present a vehicle in 
which to do so. In addition, the relationship between E.O. 11246 and 
Title VII appears never to have been addressed. In light of the ex-
---. - -"-- --------~---
pansive affirmative action obligation imposed by the E.O., the 
effect of that order in the circumstances of this case would appear 
also to raise a substantial question. 
Few other courts have considered the precise issue of voluntary 
affirmative action programs, however, and the Court might choose to 
wait until other courts have explored this area in light of the 
de.cision last term in Bakke. See Detroit Police Officers Ass 'n v. Young, 
446 F.Supp. 979, 1004 (ED Mich 1978)(striking down voluntary plan; follows 
CAS's approach). In this regard, it should be noted that petr Kaiser 
does not appear correct in arguing that the judgment below is in con-
flict with the judgments of other circuits. The cases upon which 
Kaiser relies, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, supra, 452 F.2d, at 330, 
all rested upon findings of past discrimination in the industry or by 
the union involved. 
Should the Court believe the issue important, however, there would 
appear to be no reason to follow the SG's recommendation to GVR. The 
SG argues that a remand would allow the record to be supplemented to 
determine if the 1974 agreement was adopted as a result of findings and 
recommendations made by the OFCC, and to this end it has lodged two 
( documents with the Clerk purporting to demonstrate the likelihood that 
' 
such government involvement could be shown. There is no evidence 
to this effect in the record, however, and the generalized documents 
lodged by the SG show only that the government made observations and 
recommendations to Kaiser with regard to. minority hiring, but not that 
the OFCC made findings of past discrimination or specific recommendations 
that a certain type of on-the-job program be adopted. Nor is there 
any evidence to support the SG's thesis that a remand would permit 
the introduction of evidence establishing past discrimination. The 
DC specifically found that no such evidence existed. And in light 
of the Court's division in Bakke and the fact that Bakke dealt with 
significantly different issues the value of a remand for reconsideration 
in light of that case appears questionable. 
There is one response to all three petns. 
Grant. 
11/22/78 McDaniel opn in petn 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: united ·steelworkers v. Weber, No. 78-432; 
&·chemical ·corp; v. Weber, No. 78-435; 
Weber, NO. 7B 4~6 
DATE: D-......_k., :tt::\J \"11'& 
Kaiser ·Aluminum 
united ·states v. 
You have asked me to take another look at this case in 
light of the availability of only eight justices to hear ~ ;t 
~ In particular you are concerned whether you would be 
inclined to affirm the court below, thus setting the stage for a 
likely 4-4 split. I have qone over the opinions below and the 
various filings with an eye toward the problems presented by 
McDonald v. santa ·Fe ·Trails ·Transportation ·co;, 427 u.s. 273 
·, 
. ~ . 
. ' 
2. 
(1976), and your opinion in Bakke. As I have told you, I 
approach this case with perhaps an excess of concern about the 
dangers and undesirability of reverse discrimination, but I have 
tried to put this bias aside and to present both sides of this 
difficult case. On balance, however, I believe a real problem 
exists here, as I think the likelihood of your voting to affirm 
is substantial. 
I 
First, it is important to nail down what this case does 
not involve. Petitioners were found to have violated Title VII 
only. There is no constitutional issue here, either as a basis 
for respondent's claim or as a defense. Indeed, as there is no 
state action here, the equal protection clause could not be 
implicated. Further, unlike Bakke, it is clear that the 
statutory question does not implicate any constitutional issue. 
Title VII, unlike Title VI, does not incorporate the 
constitutional standard for discrimination. Compare Griqqs v. 
Duke · Power · co~, 401 u.s. 424 (1971), with washington v. Davis, 
426 u.s. 229 (1976). Thus this case present only a question of 
statutory interpretation. As far as I can tell, the press and 
public (including several lawyers I have talked to) have missed 
this point entirely. 
In addition, there is a finding of fact by the district 
court, affirmed by the court of appeals, that before instituting 
~~....Jc. 
the program under tedllrsuge here petitioners had not engaqed in 
any conduct that violated Title VII. Under the two-court rule, 
then, this Court is bound to accept as given that petitioners not 
------------------~~--------------~ 
3. 
only have never been adju~ged guilty of discrimination, but that 
t ~ • 
if petitioners had been brought to trial, they would have been 
found innocent of any past discrimination. It may be, as Judge 
Wisdom arqued in his dissent, that this is the wrong standard--
that the question should be not whether petitioners in fact were 
guilty of past discrimination, but whether they reasonably could 
have believed themselves guilty. But, to the extent the former 
issue is relevant, the lower courts have resolved it against 
petitioners. 
II 
In McDonald, supra, a unanimous Court held "that Title 
VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners 
in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were 
they Negroes and [their favored coworker] white." 427 u.s., at 
280. In a footnote aPpended to that statement, the Court 
reserved the question presented by this case: 
"Santa Fe disclaims that the actions challenged 
here were any part of an affirmative action 
program, see Brief for Respondent Santa Fe 19 n. 5, 
and we emphasize that we do not consider here the 
permissibility of such a program, whether 
judicially required or otherwise prompted." Id~, 
at 280-281, n. 8. 
To put the point somewhat narrowly, then, this case involves only 
the extension of McDonald to an "otherwise prompted" affirmative 
action program. 
The pertinent statutory language and leqislative history 
of Title VII is reviewed in McDonald, and I shall not repeat it 
here. See id~, at 279-280. They indicate that Title VII forbids 
"discrimination" against whites, but do not answer the question 
4. 
whether "affirmative action" is "discrimination." The framework 
for finding an answer to that riddle lies, I believe, in your 
opinion in Bakke. That does not end the matter, however: Even 
if an affirmative action program constitutes discrimination 
against whites, it still may be possible to construe Title VII as 
providing a defense when discrimination results from a good faith 
affirmative action program. I will deal with each of these 
issues separately. 
A A 
As I read your opinion in Bakke, it seems to indicate 
fairly clearly that affirmative action, in spite of its benign 
purpose, still results in racial discrimination. The following 
language seems pertinent: 
"All state-imposed classifications that rearrange 
burdens and benefits on the basis of race are 
likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the 
individuals burdened. The denial to innocent 
persons of equal rights and opportunities may 
outrage those so deprived and therefore may be 
perceived as invidious. These individuals are 
likely to find little comfort in the notion that 
the deprivation they are asked to endure is merely 
the price of membership in the dominant majority 
and that its imposition is inspired by the 
supposedly benign purpose of aiding others. One 
should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness 
of, and the perception of mistreatment that 
accompanies, a system of allocating benefits and 
privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic 
origin." Bakke, supra, at 25 n. 34. (emphasis in 
original). 
In this case, of course, the state has not been involved in the 
allocation of burdens and benefits on the basis of race: rather, 
only private discrimination is involved. Although this is an 
important distinction, I am not sure it makes a difference with 
5. 
respect to the point at issue. From respondent's point of view, 
' 
it matters little that his union, rather than the government, was 
responsible for creating a system that denied him promotion 
because of his race. ---
-
One might argue that respondent may exercise a greater 
political role within his union than he can within his 
government, thereby lending a coloring of voluntariness to the 
disadvantages imposed by the union. This strikes me as 
unrealistic, however. This union, like many, is an enormous 
organization, larger than at least some of the organs of state 
and local government whose discriminatory acts would constitute 
state action. I do not see how one properly may trust this union 
to act as a representative of its individual members' interests 
any more than one can trust a governmental body always to serve 
the needs of its constituents. 
Finally, in Bakk~ you rejected the argument that members 
of the group that constitutes a majority within the entity 
imposing burdens thereby do not suffer discrimination. You 
observed there: 
·. 
"The concepts of 'majority' and 'minority' 
necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and 
political iudgments. As observed above, the white 
'majority' itself is composed of various minority 
groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of 
prior discrimination at the hands of the state and 
private individuals. Not all of these groups can 
receive preferential treatment and corresponding 
judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms 
of race and nationality, for then the only 
'majority' left would be a new minority of White 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants. There is no principled 
basis for deciding which groups would merit 
'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would 
not." Id;, at 26. 
6. 
As an abstract proposition, then, I think you would regard the 
kind of iniury suffered by respondent as a form of racial 
discrimination which Title VII forbids. The really difficult 
question, of course, is whether Title VII should or can be 
interpreted not to forbid this kind of racial discrimination in 
certain circumstances, and if so what those circumstances are. 
B 
I 
It seems clear that injuries of the kind Title VII 
generally forbids are lawful if created pursuant to an 
appropriate remedial purpose. Your opinion in Bakke indicated 
that the imposition of burdens as the basis of race was 
permissible when the injury resulted from preferential 
classifications used to remedy "proven constitutional or 
statutory violations." Id~, at 33. But, you went on to observe, 
" [w)e have never approved a classification that aids persons 
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the 
expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, 
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or 
statutory findings." Id~, at 38. In the course of your 
discussion, you referred specifically to Title VII as supportinq 
this limit on the remedial use of racial preferences: 
"Moreover, the presumption in Griqqs-- that 
disparate impact without any show1ng of business 
justification established the existence of 
discrimination in violation of the statute-- was 
based on legislative determinations, wholly absent 
here, that past discrimination had handicapped 
various minority groups to such an extent that 
disparate impact could be traced to identifiable 
instances of past discrimination ••.• The Court 
emphasized that 'the Act does not command that any 
person be hired simply because he was formerly the 
subject of discrimination, or because he is a 
member of a minority group. ' ' . • • Indeed, ~ 7 03 ( j) 
of the Act makes it clear that preferential 
treatment for an individual or minority group to 
correct an existing 'imbalance' may not be required 
under Title VII. 42 u.s.c. ~ 2000e-2(j). Thus, 
Title VII principles support the proposition that 
findings of identified discrimination must precede 
the fashioning of remedial measures embodying 
racial classifications." Id~, at 39-40, n. 44. 
LM-~~ -
This passage in! icafes that racial preferences not based on 
1\ 
7. 
findings of identified past discrimination are inconsistent with 
Title VII. If such preferences are inconsistent with the Act, it - --
follows logically that the statute creates no special exemption 
for them. Consequently racial preferences by employers subject 
to the Act, if not based on findings of discrimination, should 
violate the Act. 
There are no judicial findings to sustain the preference 
at issue in this case; indeed, both of the courts below found 
that no judicial findings of discrimination could have been made. 
The question remains whether the preference used by petitioners --can be sustained by legislative or administrative findings. One 
might draw the negative inference from§ 703(i) of Title VII, 
which states that preferences for minorities are not required by 
that statute, that such preferences nonetheless are permitted. 
But I think this would be stretching it a bit. The thrust of 
Title VII as interpreted by this Court is entirely in the other 
dir.ection: all conduct that burdens one race more than another, 
~----------------------------------------------------
unless justified by employment or compensatory considerations, is ------- ----------------------------------------~~ prohibited. The fact that § 703(i) does not expressly prohibit 
minority preferences does not undercut the Act's general 
8. 
prohibition of racial preferences, whether majority or minority. 
' 
Nor, as far as I am aware, are their administrative 
findings that sustain the racial preference in question. 
Executive Order 11246 miqht be considered an administrative 
determination of some sort, but only with qreat difficulty may 
one construe it to approve Kaiser's program. The Order does 
require federal contractors, including Kaiser, "to take 
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and 
that employees are treated duri~g employment, without regard to 
their race, color, religion, sex or national oriqin." § 202(j). 
On its face this regulation would appear to forbid what Kaiser 
has done, namely treating employees with reqard to race during 
employment. As far as I know, the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance, which has the responsibility for enforcing this 
regulation, has not in turn issued any regulations to the 
contrary. And in Bakke, you observed, "Every decision upholding 
the requirement of preferential hiring under Executive Order 
11246 has emphasized the existence of previous discrimination as 
a predicate for the imposition of a preferential remedy." Bakke, 
supra, at 32 n. 40. 
Judge Wisdom's dissent identifies another interest which 
might be construed to limit Title VII's prohibition of racial 
preferences. As he observed, Title VII seeks to promote 
voluntary conciliation of discrimination claims. The decision of 
the court below creates an impediment to that policy, at least 
where the satisfaction of claims involves disadvantaging non-
claimants. He proposed as an accomodation of Title VII's 
9. 
conciliation policy the creation of a "zone of reasonableness" to 
provide employers and unions with a safe harbor: "If an 
affirmative action plan, adopted in a collective bargaining 
agreement, is a reasonable remedy for an arguable violation of 
Title VII, it should be upheld." Pet. App. at 45a-46a. 
Your opinion in Bakke reiected the argument that 
institutions without governmental supervision could seek to 
redress "societal" discrimination, id~, at 26-27, n. 36, but you 
did not address whether institutions could seek to remedy their 
own past misdeeds. When an employer knows he has violated the 
Act and seeks to eliminate the problem, it might not make sense 
to punish him because he did not wait for a complaint to be 
filed. The question presented here, however, is what happens 
under Title VII when an employer turns out to be wrong in 
believing he had misdeeds to correct. 
The arguments in favor of Judge Wisdom's position seem 
clear. If a safe harbor does not exist, then employers will be 
discouraged from voluntary efforts to remedy past violations. 
More litigation would result, clogging already crowded dockets. 
To avoid liability for back pay and attorneys' fees, employers 
would dig in their heels, leaving some past wrongs uncorrected. 
The goal of eliminating discrimination will be frustrated and 
delayed. 
There are strong arguments, however, for not according 
employers such leeway. First, and perhaps foremost, I can find 
nothing in the statute, its legislative history, or its 
administrative interpretation that can serve as a source for this 
t 
1 0. 
"zone of reasonableness" standard. What Judge Wisdom seeks to do 
is to create by judicial interpolation a special defense to 
-~ 
--------------- ----------------statutory liability. Were this a constitutional case, that -------technique would be acceptable and even desirable, but there is 
less room for judicial creativity of this sort in the 
interpretation of a statute. 
Second, I am not sure Judqe Wisdom accurately identified 
the voluntary compliance policy Title VII actually embodies. As 
I understand it, Title VII's voluntary conciliation process is 
supposed to take place under the auspices of, and to be 
supervised by, the EEOC. Here petitioners avoided the EEOC 
altogether. I am not sure that Title VII can be said to promote 
completely unsupervised settlement of claims. 
Third, the concept of voluntary conciliation assumes 
that all parties are represented in the agreement. I am not 
entirely comfortable with the notion that the union can bind 
respondent to a program that disadvantages him on account of his 
race. As I indicated above, we do not permit governments, which 
also are representative entities, to discriminate against their 
citizens. One of the principal reasons why governments are 
denied this power is a belief, which runs through all of this 
Court's modern race decisions, that the political process is an 
inadequate check on the dangers presented by racial 
discrimination. I think a respectable argument can be made for 
the proposition that racial discrimination also is too serious a 
matter to be left to intra-union politics. 
Fourth, the test Proposed by Judge Wisdom is a two-edged 
1 1 • 
sword. It would permit employers who perceived an imbalance in 
their work force in favor of particular racial groups to 
institute, without judicial or administrative approval, programs 
that niscriminate against those groups. To take a not too far-
fetched example, the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority, 
which, we learned in Beazer, employs a disproportionately high 
number of blacks and Puerto Ricans, might start giving 
preferences to white applicants. Under Judge Wisdom's standard, 
the Transit Authority could use these preferences even if the 
racial imbalance among its employees was entirely legitimate, as 
long as it reasonably could have believed that an arguable 
violation of Title VII had occurred. Instances where this test 
could be use to shield programs discriminating against women 
probably are plentiful-- my intuitive iudgment is that quite a 
few institutions of higher education would be free to stop hiring 
or promoting women professors altogether. 
There is an argument that Judge Wisdom did not make, but 
might be inferred from his opinion. He apparently would have 
limited his holding to affirmative action programs produced by 
collective bargaining. From the employer's point of view, it 
does not matter whether a union ratifies affirmative action--
his concern is simply to eliminate any potential violation before 
being brought to court. Union participation, however, implicates 
another important federal policy-- the protection of the 
collective bargaining process. There is embedded in federal 
labor policy a strong concern for promoting collective 
bargaining, even at the expense of individual employee interests. 
12. 
Ordinarily particular employees cannot come in and attack an 
agreement as favoring other members of the bargaining unit at 
their expense. It is assumed that a union may distribute 
unevenly benefits and burdens among the employees it represents, 
and that flexibility in this regard is essential to a union's 
ability to reach an accomodation with an employer. Respondent's 
claim falls into that class of complaints which are disfavored--
he is attacking a portion of a collective bargaining agreement 
because it favors other employees over him. Thus federal labor 
policy might constitute an independent ground for relieving 
petitioners from Title VII liability. 
There are, however, persuasive (at least for me) 
arguments cutting against this approach. Title VII in a way is 
an exception to the general federal labor policy. It forbids one 
way of distributing benefits among employees, namely along racial 
lines. Section 703(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c), 
expressly forbids a labor union from causing or attempting "to 
cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in 
violation of this section." In short, there is no exemption to 
Title VII for collective bargaining. 
III 
In light of the above, I believe the decision of the 
court below would be consistent with the views you have expressed 
previously and that reversal, at least at first blush, would be 
inconsistent with these views. I by no means intend to suggest 
that the question is closed, or that a good opinion could not be 
written to support either result. What I hope I have done is to 
1 3. 
have fleshed out some of the problems that must be confronted in 
deciding this case. 
A decision by this Court affirming the court below ----- -
probably would have an immediate impact of greater proportion 
')f. 
thaA an outright affirmance in Bakke would have had. Because a 
prima facie case is easier to prove under Title VII, the 
potential class of reverse discrimination plaintiffs under this 
statute probably is larger than those who may bring 
constitutional claims. Congress, of course, can ameliorate this 
problem by modifying the statute, but the chances of disruption 
and increased litigation are substantial. 
A reversal, however, also could create considerable ____, 
mischief. Unless the Court were to overrule McDonald, any ---limitation of Title VII created to accomodate affirmative action 
programs would have to be constructed so as also to accomodate 
racial preferences that harm minorities or women. The immediate 
threat probably is not as great as that presented by an 
affirmance, but over time the harm might be even more pernicious. 
Further, the underlying problem of reverse discrimination would 
not be resolved: persons in respondent's position still will 
have constitutional claims to press. 
These considerations orobably do not add anything to the 
legal question presented by this case, but they do indicate the 
importance of the issue presented. I probably have raised more 
problems in this memo than I have solved. I of course stand 
ready to look further into these questions. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
The concern expressed briefly at Conference as to 
the ~ossibility of a "four-four" division, with John not 
part1cipating, has loomed larger in my mind with further 
thinking about the issue present~d in these cases. 
CAS. held (Wisdom, J., dissenting) that petitioners 
had violated Title VII by an affirmative action program that 
discriminated against whites. No constitutional issue is 
presented, either as a basis for respondent's claim or as a 
defense. Indeed, in the absence of state action the Equal 
Protection Clause is not implicated. The case thus presents 
only a question of statutory interpretation, but a question 
that will have far-reaching consequences however we may 
resolve it. 
The affirmative action program comes to us as 
having been adopted voluntarily pursuant to collective 
bargaining, and therefore has the support both of management 
and the union. There is a finding of fact by the District 
Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that petitioners 
had not engaged in any prior conduct that violated Title 
VII. Thus, unlike cases we have considered before, the 
affirmative action program has not been adopted to remedy 
judicially or legislatively found past discrimination. 
Indeed, I suppose - in cases like this - neither management 
nor the union would wish to confess past discrimination as 
this could invite suits for backpay and damages. 
The case therefore presents rather starkly the 
question whether an affirmative action program for the 
benefit of minorities constitutes discrimination against 
whites that is forbidden by Title VII. It is clear beyond 
doubt, I suppose, that management and the union could not 
have adopted such a program for the benefit of whites. I 
recall - as perhaps a not too far fetched example - what the 
record showed in Beazer where New York Metropolitan Transit 
Authority employeJ a substantially disproportionately higher 
number of Negroes and Puerto Ricans than the population 
percentages would justify. I doubt if a program designed to 
correct this "imbalance" could pass muster. 
Moreover, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trails 
Transporation Co., we held unan1mous!y ~tfiat T1t!e VII 
proh1b1ts rac1al discrimination against the white 
petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be 
applicable were they Negroes •••• " 427 u.s., at 280. We 
were careful in McDonald, however, to reserve the question 
presented by the present case. See note 8 at pp. 280-281. 
Although I have not examined the legislative history with 
this question in mind, it can be argued that an affirmative 
action program does not constitute the type of 
discrimination proscribed by Title VII, particularly where 
the program is the result of collective bargaining. Perhaps 
support for this argument could be inferred from the 
government's consistent encouragement of such programs, a 
policy certainly tolerated by Congress. On the other hand, 
from the viewpoint of the respondent in this case (or of 
anyone similarly situated), I suppose it matters little 
whether the denial of benefits accorded other persons 
similarly situated except for race, is occasioned by a 
program characterized as "affirmative action" rather than by 
isolated acts of discrimination. Nor would it make any 
practical difference to respondent whether the denial of the 
benefit resulted from joint action by his employer and 
union, rather than by government. 
I emphasize at this point that although I have 
done a good deal more reading and thinking since the 
Conference than before I voted to grant, I am far from being 
at rest on the issue. At the time of our Conference, I was 
inclined to believe that CAS had decided the case 
erroneously. I am now not at all sure that this would be my 
ultimate judgment. 
But I am now persuaded that it would be unwise to 
have tbis case argued before a Court with less than all 
2. 
. --· .. - - 
nine of us sitting. Affirmance by an evenly divided Court 
would result in a period of distinct uncertainty as to the 
status of voluntary affirmative action programs in the 
absence of past discrimination. 
The Court also might fairly be subject to 
criticism for taking the case with knowledge that a Justice 
could not particip3te. I therefore raise the question 
whether we should reexamine our decision to grant this case. 
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J<'lnuary 2, 1979 
No. 78-432 United Steelworkers v. Weber 
--N0.-7S-435 Kaiser Alumfiilim v. WPber 
-No. 78-436 On1teo SfRtes v:-wener 
MEMORANDUM TO ~RE CONFERENCE: 
ThP conc~rn exoressed briefly at Confer~nce as to 
the Possibility of a "four-four" division, with John not 
partirioatinq, has loo~Pd l3rqer in ~v mind with further 
thinking ahout the issue oresented in these cases. 
C'f'\r, helr' (h'is,iom, J., diss(~ntinq) th3t oetitioners 
had violat~d ritle VII by an affirmative action oroqram that 
discriminated aqainst whites. No constitutional issue is 
presented, either as a basis for resPondent's claim or as a 
defense. Indeed, in the ~bssnce of state action the Equal 
Protection Claus0 is not implicated. ThP case thus pres@nts 
only a ~uestion of st~tutory intAroretation, but a qu~stion 
th~t will have far-reachinq consequences however we may 
resolve it. 
The affirmative action oroqram comes to us as 
having b~en adopted voluntarily oursuant to collective 
barqainino, an<i thPrefnrG h~s t'h~ supoort 1-:>oth of manaqemr>nt 
and the union. reht::!re is u findinq of fact by the District 
Court, ~ffirmed by thP Court of Appeals, that oetitioners 
had not enqaqecl in anv prior conduct that violated ~itle 
VII. Thus, unlike cases wo h~VP conqi~ered before, the 
affirmative action nr0qrnm has not been adopted to remedy 
judicinlly or lcqisla~ively found past discrimination. 
~Indeed, I suppose - in cases like this - neither management 
nor the union would wish to confess past discrimination as 
this could invite suits for backpay and damagAS. 
The case therefore presents rather starkly the 
question whether an affirmative action proqrarn for the 
. ' 
.· 
benefit of minorities constitutes discrimination against 
whites that is forbidden by Title VII. It is clear beyond 
doubt, I suppose, that manaqernent and the union could not 
have adopted such a program for the benefit of whites. I 
recall - as perhaps a not too far fetched example - what the 
record showed in Beazer where New York Metropolitan Transit 
Authority employed a substantially disproportionately higher 
number of Negroes and Puerto Ricans than the population 
percentages would justify. I doubt if a proqram designed to 
correct this "imbalance" could pass muster. 
Moreover, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trails 
Transporation Co., we held unan1mous!y "Efiat T1tle VII 
prohibits raciaf discrimination against the white 
petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be 
applicable were they Negroes •••• " 427 u.s., at 280. We 
were careful in McDonald, hnw~ver, to reserve the question 
presented by the present case. See note 8 at pp. 280-281. 
Although I have not P.xamined the legislative history with 
this question in mind, it can be argued that an affirmative 
action program does not constitute the type of 
discrimination proscribed by Title VII, particularly where 
the program is the result of collective baraaininq. Perhaps 
supPort for this argument could be inferred from the 
government's consi~tent encouraqement of such programs, a 
policy certainly tolerated by Congress. On the other hand, 
from thP viewpoint of the respondent in thi~ case (or of 
anyone similarly situated), I suppose it matters little 
whether the denial of benefits accorded othPr persons 
similarly situated excePt for race, is occasioned by a 
proqram characterized as "affirmative action" rather than by 
isolated acts of discrimination. Nor would it make any 
practical difference to respondent whether the denial of the 
benefit resulted from joint action by his employer and 
union, rather than by government. 
I emphasize at this point that althouqh I have 
done a good deal more readinq and thinking since the 
Conference than before I voted to qrant, I am far from beinq 
at rest on the issue. At the time of our Conference, I was 
inclined to believe that CAS had decided the case 
erroneously. I am now not at all sure that this would be my 
ultimate judgment. 
But I am now persuad~d that it would be unwise to 




nine of us sitting. Affirmance by an evenly divided Court 
would result in a period of distinct uncert a inty as to the 
status of voluntary affirmative action programs in the 
absence of past discrimination. 
The Court also might fairly be subject to 
criticism for taking the case with knowledge that a Justice 
could not participate. I therefore raise the question 














· ::- :TO~ 1UC ..J~~i : :-. ": 
-~ : ~ ·r ~R }_.,. .. , 
, SII>Nl:Y EPSTEIN, £.ncu~We Ediror EDWIN M. YODER J'R .. Edirurial P~ £dihlf' 
PHIUP EVA,NS.-8.-\R.BARA GOHEN, ~ Urrn . 
. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1979 . ~; 
.._ ..... . 
~ 
- :.. .• ·; ·1 
, I 'j. -, :' ,._/ . .,. . 
/ ., 
affirming discriminates "' -
I . 
When 
Getting Allan Bakke into medical school was 
by no means . the end of reverse disCrimination 
as a courtroom .. issue in the United States. There 
_are any number of _other categories of economic · 
·and social advantage where race or sex or ethnic 
origin mightmake a difference and neither law 
-D.or poticy has 'caught up with all of them. Fur-
thermore, l1S rules proliferate, right can collide 
·with right and compliance with one ediat lead to 
-violation of another. . 
:;..:The Sears complaint dr~atized some of the 
.. possibilitieS. The g-iant company's suit ~gai1;1st 
·.the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-
·.alleged·that the government hiring' and firing . 
' strictur~ of a few years ago prevent compliance -
.with the latest government hiring and f.iring 
·. strictures. Putting yesterday's preferred catego-
ries on the payroll- World Warn and Korean 
veterans, almost all of whom are white males -
and not being able to force them into earl~ re-
.· Hrement means it's hard to find places for 
tcxla}''s favored categories, the minorities and 
women. · 
. Now tlie Supreme Court has a variation on the 
theme to deal with: the case of a man who lost 
out on a Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Compan:Y 
training program because of an affirmative ac-
tion quota reserving SO per cent of the places in · 
it for blacks. . . 
Two lower courts have already ruled in ·favor: 
of Brian Weber, the white Kaiser employee 
whose seniority would have put him in the pro-
gram except for his race. Between that and the 
· Bakke precedent; there is reason to expect that 
the high court would either do the same or leave 
it to Congress to clarify the ambiguities in the 
Civil Rights law that might justify' a contradic-
. tory decision this time around. 
It 's a drama involving more actors than Mr. 
Weber and the nine justices. however. The·EEOC 
is very much in the picture. The EEOC has a 
record of encouraging companies such as Kaiser 
to i.nstitute voluntary programs to increase the 
numbers of certain target categories of people 
on their employment rosters, whether or not 
there is any question of discrimination against 
them in the past. How forceful the encourage-
ment was for Kaiser is not known; all that can be 
said for sure is that the company had not been 
· aroused of discrimination in any of its personnel 
policies before setting up its quotas. 
And now EEOC lawyers have f.iled a brief with · 
the Supreme Court urging a decision that would, 
in effect, remove all such "voluntary" programs 
f.rom the threat of reverse discrimination suits. 
They want the latest EEOC guidelines to be 
recognized at the highest legal level as "the 
proper standard" for all hiring, training and 
promoting. The guidelines suggest legal im-
munity for sex and race quotas set up voluntarily . 
by employers who have "reasonable" fears of 
being charged with bias. · 
There would be comfort in such a decision for 
employers eager to he_ad off trouble over the 
· composition of their work forces. It would, how-
' ever, do nothing about the grievances of the 
Brian Webers. Nor would it dispose of the practi-
cal anomalies that go with trying to set up a per· 
feat -and long-range- distribution of employ-
~ by way of imperfect- and changing- statis-
tics. 
Furthermore, should the Court be swayed by 
the EEOC arguments, it is easy to see what would . 
happen next. It's a short step f. rom making· quotas 
legitimate to making them compulsory. A gov-
ernment guideline, as everybody knows, has 
about as mueh genuine option in it as a top ser-
geant's call for volunteers at the front. · 
Meanwhile, the wrongness of quotas is ·as glar-
ing as ever. They discourage merit initiatives, ar-
t-ificiaHy categorize people, · usurp private 
authority and perpetrate contemporary unfair· 
nesses to redress historic wrongs. 
The Bakke decision was no white-supremacy 
ediGt. It took sympathetic note of past race dis-
crimination, leaving wide latitude for compensa-
tory aGtion on a case-by-case basis. But it rightly . 
rejected the rigidity of the quota approach. We 
hope its spirit influences the court in Mr. 
Weber's case, and in whatever others come up 
because public policy places legitimate individ· 
ual claims in competition. · 





.. . ........ 
.... 
······················· 
........... .. ................ . 
. .... ............ ... .... . .. ... ............... 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
j)u.prtutt <lfonrt ltf tlyt ~lt .§tz 
~ufrittgtcn. ~. <!J. 20gi)l>2 
March 30, 1979 
(78-432 - United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 
(78-435 - Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Weber 
(78-436 - United States v. Weber 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Until I can report to Lewis and ascertain his 
position, which I will canvass today, I will remain 
in my "Pass" position. Deference to a colleague 
unavoidably absent from participation in a case so 
inherently and institutionally important commands no 
less in my judgment. Obviously Lewis' view cannot 
be controlling either on the merits or on reargument 
in light of the vote, but he is due no less so far 
as I am concerned. 
This will enable me to cast a firm vote promptly. 
Reg~~ 
CHAMB!:RS o..-
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
..§u.prnttt Clfouri af tlrt ~b ~ 
~ufrin!l'hm ~. QJ. 20,?'!~ 
April 1, 1979 . 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: 78-354)United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 
) 
78-435)Kaiser Aluminum & Chern Corp v. Weber 
) 
78-436)U.S. v. Weber 
I have reported to Lewis on the Conference, and 
I now vote to affirm in the above case. 
I would, as I stated at Conference, much prefer 
to have employers free to initiate their own private programs 
to give minorities preferential treatment. However, I 
can find no principled basis to avoid the explicit language 
of the relevant statutory provisions which foreclose such 
programs based on race. 
Accordingly, I have requested Bill Brennan to 
take responsibility for the assignment. 
Regards, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
j)uprmtt <!Jllltti ttf llft ~lt ;§fattg 
Jfag!rittghm, ~. <!J. 2Ll~){.j 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
May 7, 1979 
Re: 78-432, United Steelworkers v. Weber 
Dear Bi 11 , 
If there are three others who join your proposed 
opinion, I shall also join in order to make it an 
opinion of the Court. Considering the diversity of our 
views, I think you have done an admirable job. It may 
be that I shall have a few very minor suggestions. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
j)u:putttt Qf!lu.rt llf tqt ~b j)tlrltn 
'lliJanlfingtGn, ~. cq. 20p'!~ 
May 7, 1979 
/ 
Re: 78-432 - United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, etc. 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 





JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~u:prtmt <!Jcttrl!tf f1tt 'Jlnitt~ ~~g 
jiret.S'fri:nghm. ~. <!f. 2llg!Jt~ 
/ 
May 7, 1979 
Re: Nos. 78-432, 78-435 & 78-436 - United Stee1workers 
v. Weber 
Dear Bill: 
In due course I will circulate a dissent from your 
opinion in this case. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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C HAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.§upuutt Qfettrl of tltt ~nit.eb- j;htt?l{ 
~:ud[htgtmt. ~. "f. 2!1,?'!~ , 
May 8, 1979 
/ 
Re: No. 78-432, 435, and 436 - Steel Workers 
v. Weber, etc 
Dear Bill: 
My posture is essentially the same as Byron's. 
It is likely that I shall join your draft, but I, too, 
prefer to see what is written on the other side. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
,•. 
May 8 , 1979 
78-432 United Steelworkers v . Weber 
Dear Bill: 
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that 
I took no part in the consideration or decision of this case . 
Sincer~ly, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 




.Suprmu afonrl ~ tJre ~dt ,jmteg 
JJaglp:n.gton. ~. <q:. 2ll,?J.l..;l 
CHAMI!IERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE May 8, 1979 
Re: 78-432, 78-435 & 78-436 - United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 
etc. 
Dear Bill, 
It is likely that I shall sign up 
on your present draft, but I shall wait 
to see what is written on the other 
side before deciding whether I have 
suggestions of substance to submit. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
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:SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
. NOS. 78-432, 78-435, AND 78-436· 
United Steelworkers of America, 
AFL-CIO- CLC, Petitionet9 
9 MAY ,979 
i ~-
-•7 -432 v. 1~w,r~~ 
Brian F. Weber et al. 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical 
Corporation, Petitioner, 
t1'1<6~.14f ' On Writs of Certiorari ~ --
·78-435 v. 
Brian F. Weber et aL 
United States et al. , Petitioners, 
78-436 v. 
Brian F. Weber et ai 
the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit. 
[May - 9 1979] 
MR.. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Challenged here is the legality of an affirmative action 
plan-collectively bargained by an employer and a union~ 
that reserves for black employees 50% of the openings in an 
in-plant craft training program until the percentage of black 
craft workers in the plant is commensurate with the per-
centage of blacks m the local labor force. The question for 
decision is whether Congress, in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e, left employers 
and unions in the private sector free to take such race-
conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in 
traditionally segregated job categories. We hold that Title 
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I 
In 1974 petitioner United Steelworkers of America (USWA) 
and petitioner Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation 
(Kaiser) entered into a master collective-bargaming agree-
ment covering terms and conditions of employment at 15 
Kaiser plants. The agreement contained, inter alia, an af-
firmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicious racial 
imbalances in Kaiser's then almost exclusively white craft 
work forces. Black craft hiring goals were set for each Kaiser 
plant equal to the percentage of blacks in the respective local 
labor forces. To enable plants to meet these goals, on-the-
job training programs were established to teach unskilled pro-
duction workers----black and white--the skills necessary to 
become craft workers. The plan reserved for black employees 
50% of the openings in these newly created in-plant training 
programs. 
This case arose from the operation of the plan at Kaiser's 
plant in Gramercy, La. Until 1974 Kaiser hired as craft 
workers for that plant only persons who had had prior craft 
experience. Because blacks had long been excluded from 
eraft unions/ few were able to present such credentials. As 
1 Judicuu findings of exclusion from crafts on racial grounds are so 
numerous as to make such exclu~ion a proper subject for judiCial notice. 
Sec, e. g., Umted States v. Intematwnal Union of Elevator Constructors, 
538 F. 2d 1012 (CA3 1976); Associated General Contractors of Massa-
chusetts v. Alshuler, 490 F. 2d 9 (CA11973); Unzted States v. Wood, Wire 
and Metal Lathers, 471 F. 2d 40S (CA2 1973); Southern Illinois Bu1/ders 
Association v. Ogilve, 471 F. 2cl 680 (CA7 1972); Contractors Association 
of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. 2d 159 (CA3 
1971), Local 53 of International Association of Heat & Frost, etc . v. 
Vogler, 407 F . 2d 1047 (CA5 1969), Buckner v. Goodyear, 339 F. Supp. 
1108 (ND Ala. 1972), aff'd without opmion, 476 F. 2d 1287 (CA5 1973) 
See al·o United States CommJ:s:;wn on Civil Rights, The Challrnge Ahead 
(1976), pr> 58-94 (summarizing ,111dlcial findings of discrimmatwn by 
I 
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~ consequence, prior to 1974 only 1.83% (five out of 273) of 
the skilled craft workers at the Gramercy plant were black, 
even though the work force in the Gramercy area was ap-
proximately 39ro black. 
Pursuant to the national agreement Kaiser altered its craft 
hiring practice in the Gramercy plant. Rather than hiring 
already· trained outsiders, Kaiser established a training pro-
gram to train its production workers to fill craft openings. 
Selection of craft trainees was made on the basis of seniority, 
with the proviso that at least 50% of the new trainees were 
to be black until the percentage of black skilled craft workers 
in the Gramercy plant approximated the percentage of blacks 
in the local labor force. See 415 F. Supp. 761, 764. 
During 1974, the first year of the operation of the Kaiser-
USW A affirmative action plan, 13 craft trainees were selected 
from Gramercy's production work force. Of these, 7 were 
black and 6 white. The most junior black selected into the 
program had less seniority than sever~l white production 
workers whose bids for admission were rejected. Thereafter 
one of those white production workers, respondent Brian 
Weber, instituted this class action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 
The complaint alleged that the filling of craft trainee posi-
tions at the Gramercy plant pursuant to the affirmative action 
program had resulted in junior black employees receiving 
training in preference to more senior white employees, thus 
discriminating against respondent and other similarly situated 
craft unions) , Myrdal, An American D1lemma (1962) 1079-1124; Mar-
shall and Bnggs, Thr Negro and Apprenticeship (1967); Spero and Harris, 
The Black Worker (1968); Umtrd States Commisswn on C1vil Rights, 
Employment (1961), p. 97; State AdVLo;ory Committee, United States 
ComJm:>;;ion on Civil R1ghts, 50 Stat~s Report (1961), p. 209; Marshall, 
' 'The Negro in Southern Unions," in The Negro and the American Labor 
Movement (ed. Jaeob80n, Anchor 1968) p 145 : Appendix, at 63, 104. 
"l... 
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white employees m violation of §§ 703 (a) 2 and (d) 3 of 
Title VII. The District Court held that the plan violated 
Title VII, entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff class, 
and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting Kaiser and 
the USWA "from denying plaintiffs, Brian F. Weber and all 
other members of the class, access to on-the-job tra.ining pro-
grams on the basis of race." 415 F. Supp. 761 (1976). A 
divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that all employment preferences based upon 
race, including those preferences incidental to bona fide af-
firmative action plans, violated Title VII's prohibition against 
racial discrimination in employment. 563 F. 2d 216 (1978). 
We granted certiorari. -- P . S. -- (1979). We reverse. 
11 
We emphasize at the outset the narrowness of our inquiry. 
Since the Kaiser-USWA plan does not involve state action, 
this case does not present an alleged violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution. Further, since thr 
Kaiser-USW A plan was adopted voluntarily, we are not con-
2 SectiOn 703 (a), 42 U. S. C.§ 2000e-2 (a), provides : 
' (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
" (1) to fail or refuse to hire or t{) discharge any individual, or other-
wise to dn;cri:m.inate agamst any individual with respect t{) his compensa-
tion, terms, cond1tiom;, or pnvileges of employment, because of such 
mdiv1dual's race, color, rf'hgion, sex, or natwnal ongin; or 
" (2) to hm1t or cla<1sify h1s employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would depnve or tend to deprive any inclividual of 
employment. opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, becau,;e of such md1vidual':; race, color, religion, srx, or national 
ongin ." 
a Section 703 (d), 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2 (d), provides : 
" It shall be an unlawful emJ1loyment practice for any employer, labor 
orgamzatwn, or JOmt labor-management committee controlling apprentice-
ship or other training or retraining, mdudmg on-the-job training programs 
to dJ::;crimmate again~( [U1Y mdiv1dual because of hi8 race, color, religicn, 
~ex , or national ongm in admi><::-:Ion to, or employment in, any program 
eHtabh~b(:'d to provide apprcnttcrs111p or other traimnp; ' 
,_ I 
7R-432, 78-435 & 78-436-0PINION 
STEELWORKERS v. WEBER 5 
cerned with what Title VII requires or with what a court 
might order to remedy a past proven violation of the Act. 
The only question before us is the narrow statutory issue of 
whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions from 
voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans 
that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the pur-
pose provided in the Kaiser- USW A plan. That question was 
expressly left open in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 
427 U.S. 273, 281 n. 8 (1976) which held, in a case not involv-
ing affirmative action , that Title VII protects whites as well 
as blacks from certam forms of racial discrimination. 
Respondent argues that Congress intended in Title VII to 
prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action plans. Respond-
ent's argument rests upon a literal interpretation of § § 703 
(a) and (d) of the Act. Those sections make it unlawful to 
"discriminate . .. because of ... race" in hiring and in the 
selection of apprentices for training programs. Since, the 
argument runs, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trans. Co., supra, 
settled that Title VII forbids discrimiuation against whites as 
well as blacks, and since the Kaiser-USW A affirmative action 
plan operates to discriminate against white employees solely 
because they are white, it follows that the Kaiser-USW A plan 
violates Title VII. 
Respondent's argumeu t is not without force. But it over-
looks the significance of the fact that the Kaiser-USW A plan 
is an affirmative a.ction plan voluntarily adopted by private 
parties to eliminate traditional patterns .Qf racial segregation. 
In this c0i1fext respol1cl'eiit'herlance upon a literal construc-
tion of § 703 (a) and (d) and upon McDonald is misplaced. 
SeeM cDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans . Co., supra, at 281 n. 8. 
lt is a "familiar rule. that a thing may be within the letter of 
the statute a.nd yet not within the statute, because not within 
1ts spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. '' Holy 
Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892). 
The prohibition against racial discrimination 'in§§ 703 (a) and 
7 
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(d) of Title VII must therefore be read against the back-
ground of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical 
context from which the Act a.rose. See Train v. Colorado 
Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1, 10 (1976); 
Woodworkers v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 620 (1967); United 
States v. American "I'rucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544 
(1940) . Examination of those sources makes clear that an 
interpretation of the sections that forbade all race-conscious 
affirmative action would "bring about an end completely at 
variance with the purpose of the statute" and must be re-
jected. United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U. S. 
295, 315 (1953). See Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 
427, 432 ( 1952); International Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 
342 U. S. 237, 243 (1952); Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 
135 (1950); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Oil Co., 204 
U. S. 426 (1907) . 
Congress' primary concern in ena.cting the prohibition 
against racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was with "the plight of the Negro in our econ-
omy." 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). 
Before 1964, blacks were largely relegated to "unskilled and 
semi-skilled jobs." !d., at 6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 
id., at 7204 (remarks of Sen. Clark); 2 Schwartz, Statutory 
History of the United States: Civil Rights at 1296 (remarks 
of Sen. Kennedy). Because of automation the number of 
such jobs was rapidly decreasing. See 110 Cong. Rec., at 6548 
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 7204 (remarks of Sen. 
Clark). As a consequence "the relative position of the Negro 
worker [was] steadily worsening. In 1947 the non-white 
unemployment rate was only 64 percent higher than the white 
rate; in 1962 it was 124 percent higher.'' I d., at 6548 (re-
marks of Sen. Humphrey). See also id., at 7204 (remarks of 
Sen. Clark). Congress considered this a serious social prob-
lem. As Senator Clark told the Senate : 
"The rate of Negro unemployment has gone up con-
78-432, 78-435 & 78-436-0PINION 
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sistently as compared with white unemployment for the 
past 15 years. This is a social malaise and a social situa-
tion which we should not tolerate. That is one of the 
principal reasons why this bill should pass." 110 Cong. 
Rec. 7220. 
Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights Act-
the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American 
society-could not be achieved unless this trend were reversed. 
And Congress recognized that that would not be possible 
unless blacks were able to secure jobs "which have a future." 
!d., at 7204 (remarks of Sen. ·clark). See also Schwartz, 
supra, at 1296 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). As Senator 
Humphrey explained to the Senate : 
"What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a 
fine restaurant if he cannot afford to pay the bill? What 
good does it do him to be accepted in a hotel that is too 
expensive for his modest income? How can a Negro child 
be motivated to take full advantage of integrated educa-
tional facilities if he has no hope of getting a job where 
he can use that education?" 110 Cong. Rec., at 6547. 
"Without a. job, one cannot afford public convenience 
and accommodations. Income from employment may be 
necessary to further a man's education, or that of his 
children. If his children have no hope of getting a good 
job, what will motivate them to take advantage of edu-
cational opportunities." Schwartz, supra, at 1234. 
These remarks echoed President Kennedy's original message 
to Congress upon the introduction of the Civil Rights Act 
m 1963. 
"There is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right 
to be admitted to hotels and restaurants if he has no cash 
in his pocket and no job." !d., at 1059. 
'. 
. .•
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Accordingly, it was clear to Congress that "the crux of the 
problem [ was·l to open employment opportunities for Negroes 
in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them/' 
id., at 6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), and it was to this 
problem that Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimi~ 
nation in employment was primarily addressed. 
It plainly appears from the House Report accompanying 
the Civil Rights Act that Congress did not intend wholly to 
prohibit private and voluntary affirmative action efforts as 
one method of solving this problem. The Report provides: 
"No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of 
the causes and consequences of racial and other types of 
discrimination against minorities. ·There is reason to 
believe, however, that national leadership provided by the j 
enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most 
troublesome problems will create an atmosphere condu~ 
cive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of 
discrimination." H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. ( 1963), at 18. (Emp1lasis supplied.) 
Given this legislative history, we cannot agree with re~ 
spondent that Congress intended to prohibit the private sector 
from taking effective steps to accomplish the goal that Con-
gress designed Title VII to achieve. ·The very statutory words 
intended as a spur or catalyst to cause "employers and unions 
to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment prac-
tices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last 
vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this 
country's history," Albemarle v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 418 
(1975), cannot be interpreted as an absolute prohibition 
against all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action 
efforts to hasten the elimination of such vestiges:' It would 
• The problem that Congresil addressed in 1964 remains with us. In 
1962 the nonwhite unemployment rate was 124% higher than the white 
rate. See Schwa,rtz, supra, at 1224 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). In 
1978 the black unemployment rate waH 129% higher . See Monthly 
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be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over 
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot 
of those who had "been excluded from the American dream 
for so long." Schwartz, supra, at 1234 (remarks of Sen. 
Humphrey), constituted the first legislative prohibition of all 
voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional 
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. 
Our conclusion is further reinforced by examination of the 
language and legislative history of § 703 (j) of Title VIV 
Opponents of Title VII raised two related arguments against 
the bill. First, they argued that the Act would be inter-
preted to require employers with racially imbalanced work 
forces to grant preferental treatment to racial minorities in 
order to integrate. Second, they argued that employers with 
racially imbalanced work forces would grant preferential trea.t-
ment to racial minorities, even if not required to do so by the 
Act. See 110 Cong. Rec. 8618-8619 (remarks of Sen. Spark-
Labor Review, U. S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics 78 
(Mar. 1979). 
5 Section 703 (j) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j), provides: 
"Nothing conta.ined in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require 
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential 
treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin of such individual or group on account of an 
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage 
of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed 
by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employ-
ment agency or labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any 
apprenticeship or othrr training program, in comparison with the total 
number or percentage or persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or 
nat.ional origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the 
available work force in MY community, State, section, or other area." 
Section 703 (j) speaks to substantivr liability under Title VII, but it 
dors not. preclude courts from considering racial imbalance as evidence of 
a Title VII violation. See Teamsters v. United States. 431 U. S. 324, 339-
340, n. 20 (1977). Remedie:; for substantive violations are governed by 
§ 706 (g)' 42 u. s. c. § 2000e-5 (g) . 
'' 
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man) . Had Congress meant to prohibit all race-conscious 
affirmative a.ction, as respondent urges, it easily could have 
answered both objections by providing that Title VII would 
not require or permit racially preferential integration efforts. 
But Congress did not choose such a course. Rather Congress 
added § 703 ( ·) which addresses only the first objection. The 
sec wn provides t a no mg con ame m Title VII "shall be 
interpreted to require any employer ... to grant preferential 
treatment ... to any group because of the race . .. of such ... 
group on account of" a defacto racial imbalance in the em-
ployer's work force. The section does not state that "nothing I 
in Title VII shall be interpreted to permit" voluntary a.ffirma-
tive efforts to correct racial imbalances. The natural infer-
ence is that Congr~ chose not to forbid all voluntary race-
conscious affirmative action. 
The reasons for this choice are evident from the legislative 
record. Title VII could not have been enacted into law with-
out substantial support from legislators in both Houses who 
traditionally resisted federal regulation of private business. 
Those legislators demanded as a price for their support that 
"management prerogatives and union freedoms ... be left 
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible." H. R. Rep. 
No. 914, 88th Cong. , 1st Sess. , 64, 150 (1963) . Section 703 
(j) was pro1~osed by Senator Dirksen to allay any fears that 
the Act migft be interpreted in such a way as to upset this 
compromise. I The section was designed to prevent § 703 of 
Title VII fr9m being interpreted in such a way as to lead to 
undue "Federal Government interference with private busi-
nesses because of some Federal employee's ideas about racial 
balance or imbala.nce." Id., at 14314 (remarks of Sen. Mil-
ler).6 See also 110 Cong. Rec. 9881 (remarks of Sen. Allott) ; 
6 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, considered in University of 
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), contains no provision 
comparable to § 703 (j). This is because Title VI was an exercise of 
federal power over a matter in which the Federal Government was already 
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id., at 10520 (remarks of Sen. Carlson); id., at 11471 (remarks 
of Sen. Javits); id., at 12817 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). 
Clearly, a prohibition against all voluntary, race-conscious, 
affirmative action efforts would disserve these ends. Such a 
prohibition would augment the powers of the Federal Govern-
ment and diminish traditional management prerogatives while 
at the same time impeding attainment of the ultimate statu-
tory goals. In view of this legislative history and in view of 
Congress' desire to avoid undue federal regulation of private 
businesses, use of the word "require" rather than the phrase 
"require or permit" in § 703 (j) fortifies the conclusion that 
Congress did not intend to limit traditional business freedom 
to such a degree as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious 
affirmative action.7 
directly involved: the prohibitions against. raer-based conduct contained in 
Title VI governed "program[s] or activit[ies] receiving Federal financial 
assistance.'~ 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. Congrcs~ was legislating to aEsure 
federal funds would not be used in an improper manner. Title VII, by 
contrast, was enacted pursuant to the Commerce power to regulate purely 
private decisionmaking and was not intended to incorporate and par-
ticularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Title 
VII and Titlr. VI, therefore, cannot. be read in pari materia. Sre 110 
Cong. Rec. 8:~14 (1964) (remark~ of Sen. Cooper) . See also id., at. 11615 
(remarks of $rn. Cooper). 
7 Responde11t argues that our construction of § 703 conflicts with vari-
<Jus remarks io the legislative record. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (Sens. 
Clark and CnKr); id., at 7218 (Sens. Clark and Case); id., at 6549 
(Sen. Humphrry); id., at 8921 (Sm. Williams). We do not agree. In 
Senator Humphrey's words, thrse comments were intended as as~urances 
that Title VII would not allow establishmrnt of systems "to rnaintain 
racial balance in employment.'' id., at 11848. They we11e not. addre~sed 
to temporary, voluntary, affirmative action measure~ undertaken to rlimi-
nate manifest racial imbalance in traditionally ~egregated job categories. 
Moreover, the comments referred to by re~pondent all preceded the 
adoption of § 703 (j), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j). After § 703 (j) was 
adopted eongrr>"sional comments wrre all to the effect that pmployrrs 
would not be required to institute preferential quotas to avoid Title VII 
liability, see, e. g., id., at 12817 (remarks of Sen. Dirksrn); id., at 13079-
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We therefore hold that Title VII's prohibition in §§ 703 (a) l 
and (d) against racial discrimination does not condemn all 
private, voluntary, race-couscious affirmative action plans. 
III 
We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation 
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action 
plans. It suffices to hold that the challenged Kaiser-USW A 
affirmative action plan falls on the permissible side of the 
line. The purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute. 
Both were designed to break down old patterns of racial segre-
gation and hierarchy. Both were structured to "open employ-
ment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have 
been traditionally closed to them." 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (re-
ma.rks of Sen. Humphrey).8 
At the same time the plan does not unnecessarily trammel 
the interests of the white employees.' The plan does not re-
quire the discharge of white workers and their replacement 
with new black hires. Cf. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. 
13080 (remarks of Sen. Clark); id., at 15876 (remarks of Rep. Lmdsay). 
There was no suggestion after the adoption of § 703 (j) tha.t wholly volun-
tary, ra,ce-conscious, affirmativE' action efforts would in them::;?lves consti-
tute a violation of Title VII. OT1 the contrary, as Repre.;;entativc 
MacGregor told the House shortly before the final vote on Tit!P VII: 
"Important as the scope and extent of this bill is, it is also vitally 
important that all Americans understand wha.t this bill does not cover. 
"Your mail and mine, your cont.a.ct:,; and mine with our constihwnts, 
indicates a great degrPe of misundero:tanding about. this bill. People com-
plain about ... preferential treatment or quota<> in employment. There 
is a mistaken belief that Congress is legislating in these a.reas in this bill. 
When we drafted this bill we excluded the:se issues largely becausp the 
problems raised by these controversial questions are more properly han-
dled at a governmental level clo~er to the American people and by com-
munities and individuals thPmselves." 110 Cong. Rec. 15893 (remarks of 
Rep. MacGregor) . 
8 See n. 1, supra. This is not to ::;uggest that the freedom of an em-
ployer to undertake race-conscious affirmative action efforts dPpends on 
whether or not his effort is motivated by fPilr of liabilit~r under Title VIL 
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Co., supra. Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the 
advancement of white employees; half of those trained in 
the program will be white. Moreover, the plan is a tem-
porary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial balance, 
but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. Prefer-
ential selection of cra.ft trainees at the Gramercy plant will 
end as soon as the percentage of black skilled craft workers in 
the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in 
the local labor force. See 415 F. Supp. 761, 763. 
We conclude, therefore, that the adoption of the Kaiser-
USW A plan for the Gramercy plant falls within the area of 
discretion left by Title VII to the private sector voluntarily 
to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate con-
spicious racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job cate-
gories.0 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal~ 
for the Fifth Circuit is 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE PowELL and MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part 
in the consideration or decision of this case. 
9 Our disposition makes unnecessary consideration of petitioners' argu-
ment that their plan was ju&iified because they feared tha.t black employ-
ees would bring suit under Title VII if they did not adopt an affirmative 
action plan. Nor need we consider petitioners' contention that their 
affirmative action plan represented an attempt to comply with Executive 
Order 11246. 
.i • • .•.• ~ 
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MOVANTS' CONTENTIONS: Movants, minority-group members and women 
who claim they were discriminated against at the Gramercy plant in the 
past, ask the Court for special leave to intervene, and if the Court is 
considering an affirmance, they ask for a r emand for a new trial with 
in structions to add them as defendants. Movants claim that the record 
- 2 -
·, .s 
~deficient in evidence of prior discrimination by petrs against 
minority groups and women, that they have such evidence, and that 
they learned of the case too late to intervene timely. 
KAISER'S CONTENTIONS: Kaiser notes that movants admit they knew 
of the case when the DC judgment was entered in 1976, and contends 
that their three years of inaction bars intervention now. Moreover, 
if the Court affirms, movants will still be free to litigate their 
claims. 
DISCUSSION: Intervention here is not necessary. If the Court 
concludes that minority groups were inadequately represented below, 
it can remand for a new trial, at which movants can seek to intervene. 
There is a response from Kaiser. 
5/29/7 f/ Richman 
PJC 
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UNITED STATES, et al. 
v. 
WEBER 
Motion of Rudy Gorden, et al. for 
Leave to Intervene and for Order 




WEBER'S RESPONSE: Weber opposes. First, he contends the affi-
davits attached to the motion should not be relied upon because they 
are incomplete and misleading; he addresses and. answers each of their 
'Y c;,ti II wov\ l\ ~ a s sertions. 
'· 
- 2 -
Second, even if the affidavits were accurate, the motion should 
\,.;;.c. 
be denied as untimely. None of the proposed intervenors claim~to have 
just learned of the case, which was the subject of great interest at 
the Gramercy plant,and of rallies and demonstrations. In addition, 
the proposed intervenors are represented by organizations that have 
already appeared in this case as amici curiae. The description of 
movants and other minority employees as unsophisticated and ignorant 
of basic rights is not supported by the affidavits or any other evidence. 
"These unfortunate and demeaning characterizations do not accurately 
describe the minority workers" at Gramercy. 
Finally, petrs h·ave adequately represented the interests of 
minority workers; the affidavits simply recite isolated and unusual 
stories of purported discrimination, and none show discrimination in 
the seniority system justifying a racial quota. If movants have valid 
claims of discrimination, they can assert them before the EEOC or the 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST J 
. < 
June 5, 1979 
Re: Nos. 78-432, 78-435, and 78-436 - United Steel-
workers v. Weber 
Dear Bill: 
I feel I owe you an apology for the length of time it 
has taken me to prepare the dissent which the Chief asked me 
to write in this case. As you know, the legislative history 
for H.R. 7152, which ultimately became the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, spans twelve bound volumes of the Congressional 
Record which encompass more than 15,000 pages. The debate in 
the Senate was the longest in that body's history -- 83 days. 
Since your opinion deals almost exclusively with the interpreta-
tion of§ 703(j), and its legislative history, I have 
naturally had to trace the same ground which you trace in your 
present opinion. All of this to one side, I have every 
intention of circulating a dissent at least on the issue 
with which your opinion deals by early next week. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
In a very real sense, the Court's opinion is ahead of its 
time: it could more appropriately have been handed down five 
years from now, in 1984, a year coinciding with the title of 
a book from which the Court's opinion borrows, perhaps sub-
consciously, at least one idea. Orwell describes in his book 
a govern men tal official of Oceania, one of the three great 
world powers, denouncing the current enemy, Eurasia, to an 
assembled crowd: 
"It was almost impossible to listen to him without being 
first convinced and then maddened. . . . The speech had 
been proceeding for perhaps twenty minutes when ames-
senger hurried onto the platform and a scrap of paper was 
slipped into the speaker's hand. He unrolled and read it 
without pausing in his speech. Nothing altered in his 
voice or manner, or in the content of what he was saying, 
--
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but suddenly the names were different. Without words 
said, a wave of understanding rippled through the crowd. 
Oceania was at war with Eastasia! . . . The banners and 
posters with which the square was decorated were all 
wrong! ... 
"[T]he speaker had switched from one line to the other 
actually in mid-sentence, not only without a pause, but 
without even breaking the syntax." G. Orwell, Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, 182-183 (1949). 
Today's decision represents a.n equally dramatic and equally 
unremarked switch in this Court's interpretation of Title VII. 
The operative sections of Title VII prohibit racial discrim-
ination in employment simpliciter. Taken in its normal 
meaning, and as understood by all Members of Congress who 
spoke to the issue during the legislative debates. see infra, at 
-, this language prohibits a covered employee from con-
sidering race when making an employment decision, whether 
the race be black or white. Several years ago, however, a 
United States District Court held that "the dismissal of white 
employees charged with misappropriating company property 
while not dismissing a similarly charged Negro employee does 
not raise a claim upon which Title VII relief may be granted." 
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 'Pranps. Co., 427 U. S. 273, 278 
( 1976). This Court unanimously reversed, concluding from 
the "uncontradicted legislative history" that "Title VII pro-
hibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in 
this case upon the same standards as would be applicable 
were they Negroes .... " 427 U. S., at 280. 
We have never waivered in our understanding that Title 
VII "prohibits all racial discrimination in employment, with-
out exception for any particular employees." !d., at 283 (em-
phasis in original). In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 
424, 429 (1971), our first occasion to interpret Title VII, a 
unanimous court observed that "[d]iscriminatory preference, 
for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what 
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Congress has proscribed." And in our most recent discussion 
of the issue, we uttered words seemingly dispositive of this 
case: "It .is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by 
Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each appli-
cant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of 
the applicant's race are already proportionately represented 
in the work force." Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 
438 U. S. 567, - (1978) (emphasis in original).1 
Today, however, the Court behaves much like the Orwellian 
speaker earlier described, as if it had been handed a note indi-
cating that Title VII would lead to a result unacceptable to 
the Court if interpreted here as it was in our prior decisions. 
Accordingly, without even a break in syntax, the Court rejects 
"a literal construction of § 703 (a)" in favor of newly dis-
covered "legislative history," which leads it to a conclusion 
directly contrary to that compelled by the "uncontradicted 
legislative history" unearthed in McDonald and our other 
prior decisions. Now we are told that the legislative history 
of Title VII shows that employers are free to discriminate on 
the basis of race: an employer may, in the Court's words, 
"trammel the interests of white employees" in favor of black 
employees in order to eliminate "racial imbalance." Ante, at 
12. Our earlier interpretations of Title VII, like the banners 
and posters decorating the square in Oceania, were all wrong. 
As if this were not enough to make a reasonable observer 
question this Court's adherence to the oft-stated principle that 
our duty is to construe rather than rewrite legislation, United 
States v. Rutherford, slip op., at 9 (June -, 1979), the 
Court also seizes upon ~ 703 (j) of Title VII as an independ-
ent, or at least partially independent, basis for its holding. 
Totally ignoring the wording of that section, which is ob-
viously addressed to those charged with the responsibility of 
1 Our ~1atcmcn1s in Gn'ggs and Furnco Construction, paten1ly inronsil:;t-
cn1 with today'~ holding, nrc not even mentioned, much les · di~tinguishcd, 
by 1 he Comt. 
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interpreting the law rather than those who are subject to its 
proscriptions, and totally ignoring the months of legislative 
debates preceding the section's introduction and passage, 
which demonstrate clearly that it was enacted to prevent 
precisely what occurred in this case, the Court infers from 
§ 703 (j) that "Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary 
race-conscious affirmative action." Ante, at 10. 
Thus, by a tour de force reminiscent not of jurists such 
as Hale, Holmes, or Hughes, but of escape artists such as 
Houdini, the Court eludes clear statutory language, "uncon-
t~adicted" legislative history, and uniform precedent in con-
cluding that employers are, after all, permitted to consider 
race in making employment decisions. It may be that one or 
more of the principal sponsors of Title VII would have pre-
ferred to see a provision allowing preferential treatment of 
minorities written into the bill. Such a provision , how-
ever, would have to have been expressly or impliedly excepted 
from Title VII's explicit prohibition on all racial discrimina-
tion in employment. There is no such exception in the Act. 
And a reading of the legislative debates concerning Title 
VII, in which proponents and opponents alike uniformly de-
nounced discrimination in favor of, as well as discrimination 
against, Negroes, demonstrates clearly that any legislator har-
boring an unspoken desire for such a provision could not 
possibly have succeeded in enacting it into law. 
I 
Kaiser opened its Gramercy, La., plant in 1958. Because 
the Gramercy facility had no apprenticeship or in-plant craft 
training program, Kaiser hired as craft workers only persons 
with prior craft experience. Despite Kaiser's efforts to locate 
and hire trained black craftsmen. few were available in the 
Gramercy area, and as a consequence, Kaiser's craft positions 
were manned almost exclusively by whites. In February 
1974, under pressure from the Office of Fede.ral Contract Com-
;/ 
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pliance to increase minority representation in craft positions 
at its various plants/ and hoping to deter the filing of em-
ployment discrimination claims by minorities, Kaiser entered 
into a collective-bargaining agreement with the United Steel-
workers of America (Steelworkers) which created a new on-
the-job craft training program at 15 Kaiser facilities, includ-
ing the Gramercy plant. The agreement required that no 
less than one minority applicant be admitted to the training 
program for every nonminority applicant until the percentage 
of blacks in craft positions equaled the percentage of blacks 
2 The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), subsequently 
renamed the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), 
is an arm of the Department of Labor responsible for ensuring compliance 
by government contractors with the equal employment opportunity re-
sponsibilities established by Executive Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 
(1965), as amended by Executive Order 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 
(1967), and by Executive Order 12086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46501 (1978). 
Executive Order 11246 requires all applicants for federal contracts to 
refrai,n from employment discrimination and to "take affirmative action 
to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated 
during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin." § 202 (j), 3 CFR § 169 (1974), reprinted following 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e (1970) . The Executive Order empowers the Secretary 
of Labor to issue rules and regulations necessary and appropriate to 
achieve its purpose. He, in turn, has delegated most enforcement duties 
to the OFCC. See 41 CFR § 60-20.1 et seq.; 41 CFR § 60-2.24. 
The affirmative action program mandated by 41 CFR § 60-2 (Revised 
Order No. 4) for nonconstruction contractors requires a "utilization" study 
to determine minority representation in the work force. Goals for hiring 
and promotion must be set to overcome any "underutilization" found to 
exist . 
The OFCC employs the "power of the purse" to coerce acceptance of 
its affirmative action plans. Indeed, in this case, "the district court found 
that the 1974 collective-bargaining agreement reflected less of a desire on 
Kaiser 's part to train black craft workers than a self-interest in satisfying 
the OFCC in order to retain lucrative government contracts." 563 F. 2d 
216, 226 (CA5 1977). 
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in the local work force. 3 Eligibility for the craft training pro-
grams was to be determined on the basis of plant seniority, 
with black and white applicants to be selected on the basis 
of their relative seniority within their racial group. 
Brian Weber is white. He was hired at Kaiser's Gramercy 
plant in 1969. In April 1974 Kaiser announced that it was 
offering a total of nine positions in three on-the-job training 
3 The pertinent portions of the collective-bargaining agreement provide: 
''It i:; further agreed that the Joint Committee will ~pecifically review the 
minority rrJlfeHrntation in the exiHting Trade, Craft and A~signed Main-
tenance classifications. in the plant>< set forth below, and, where neces,;ary, 
establish certain goah; and timr table~ in order to achieve a desired 
minority ratio : 
"[Gramercy Works listed, among other:sl 
"As apprentice and craft jobs are to be filled, the contractual ::;election 
criteria ~ hall be applied in rraching such goal;;; at a minimum, not less 
than o1w minority employE'e will C'nter for E'very non-minority employE'e 
entering until thE' goal is rC'arhed unless at a particular time there are 
insuf:ficient available qua.lified minority candidates .... 
"The tNm 'minority' as UEt'd herC'in shall be as defined in EEOC Re-
porti11g HE>quirenwnt~." 415 F. Supp. 761, 763 (ED La. 1976) . 
ThC' '·Joint Commiitee" ~ubH2qll(mtly entere<.l into a ":\Iemorandum of 
Unc.ler:;tanding" e:stabli~hing a goal of 39% as the percentage of blacks that 
must be rE'pre"E'nted in each "craft family" at Kaiser's Gramercy plant. 
!d., at 764. The goal of 39% minority representation was based on the 
percentage of minority workers available in thE' Gramercy area. 
Contrar~· to the Court's a:;::;rrtion, it is not at all clear that, Kai::;er'::; 
admiHsion quota i:s n "temporary mC'asurP" ... not intended to maintain 
racial imbalance." Ante. at 13. DenniR E. English, indu::;trial relationl:i 
superintendent at thr Gramerc~· plant, tel:itified at trial: 
"Oncr the goal il:i rE'ached of 39 percent, or whatever the figure will bE' 
down the road, I think it's subject to change, once the goal is rE'ached in 
each of the craft familir~, at that time, we w1ll then revert to a ratio of 
what that percentage i~, if it remainl:i at 39 percent and we attain 39 
percent someday, we will thC'u continue placing trainees in the program at 
that percpntage. The idea , ngain, being to have n mmority repre::;cntation 
in the plant that is equal to that representation in the community work 
force· population." App. 69 .. 
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programs for skilled craft jobs. Weber applied for all three 
programs, but was not selected. The successful candidates-
five black and four white applicants-were chosen in accord· 
ance with the 50% minority admission quota mandated under 
the 1974 collective-bargaining agreement. Two of the suc-
cessful black applicants had less seniority than Weber.4 
Weber brought the instant class action 5 in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging 
that use of the 50% minority admission quota to fill vacancies 
in Kaiser's craft training programs violated Title VII's pro-
hibition on racial discrimination in employment. The Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
agreed, enjoining further use of race as a criteria in admitting 
applicants to the craft training programs.0 
• In addition to the April programs, the company offered three more 
training programs in 1974 with a total of four positions available. Two 
white and two black employees were selected for the programs, which were 
for "Air Conditioning Repairman" (one position), "Carpenter-Painter" 
(two positions), and "Insulator" (one position). Weber sought to bid for 
the insulator trainee position, but he was not selected because that job 
was rc~erved for the most senior qualified black employee. App. 46. 
5 The class was defined to include the following employees: 
"All persons employed by Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation at 
its Gramercy, Louisiana, works who are members of the United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO Local 5702, who are not member~ of a 
minority group, and who have applied for or were eligible to apply for 
on-the-job tra.ining programs since February 1, 1974." 415 F. Supp., at 
763. 
0 In upholding the District Court's injunction, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's finding that Kaiser had not been guilty of 
any past discriminatory hiring or promotion at its Gramercy plant. The 
court thus concluded that this finding removed the instant case from this 
Court's line of "remedy" decisions authorizing fictional seniority in order 
to place proven victims of discrimination in as good a position as they 
would have enjoyed ab~ent the discriminatory hiriPg practices. See 
Franks v. Bowman 1'ransp. Co., 424 U . S. 747 (1976). "In the absence 
of prior discrimination," the Court of Appeals observed, "a racial quota 
loses it;; character as an equitablP 1'emedy m1d must lw banned a~ :m 
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II 
Were Congress to act today specifically to prohibit the type 
of racial discrimination suffered by Weber, it would be hard 
pressed to draft language better tailored to the task than that 
fountl in ~ 703 (d) of Title VII: 
"lt shall be an unlawful employment practice for any 
employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management 
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or 
retraining, including on-the-job training programs to dis-
criminate against any individual because of his race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or em-
tmlawful racial preference prohibited by Title VII, §§ 703 (a) and (d). 
TitlE' VII outlaw,; prefereBCf'S for any group, minority or majority, if based 
on race or othf'r impPrmi~sible cla~Rifications, but it does not outlaw 
prefPrencet" favoring victims of di~crimi11ation." 563 F. 2d, at 224 (rm-
phasis in original). Nor was the Court of Appeals moved by the claim 
that Kaiser'~ di~criminator~· admis~ion quota is justified to correct a lack 
of training of Negroe"' due to past societal discrimination: "Whatever other 
pffects societal di~;crimination may have, it has had-by the specific finding 
of the court below, no effect on the seniority of any party here." !d., at 
226 (Pmphasis in original) . Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the 
argmnPnt. that. Kaisrr's admission quota dof'i:i not violate TitlE' VII because. 
it i:; :;anctionrd, indPrd eompellrd, by Exrcutive Order 11246 and regula-
t ions ii'Suf'd by the OFCC mandating affirmative action by all govrrnment 
contractor:;;. See n. 2, supra. Citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sau•yer·, 34:3 U. S. 579 (1952), thf' court concluded that " l1]f ExPcutive 
Order 11246 mandates a racial quota for admission to on-the-job 1 raining 
by Kai~er, in the absence of any prior hir·ing or promotion discrimination, 
the Executivr Order must fall before the direct congressional prohibition 
[of §703 (d)J ." ld. , at 227 (empha~is in original) . 
Judge Wisdom, in di~sent, argued that '' [i]f an affirmative action plan, 
adopted in a collective bargaining agrpemcnt, i ~ a reasonable rPmedy for 
an arguable violation of Title VII, it. ~hould bf' uphPld ." ld., at 230. The 
Unit('d StatE's, in its brief bPforf' this Court, largely adopts JudgE' Wil:l-
dorn's thcor~·, which apparently rf'sb on the ronclusion that an employer 
is freE' to eorrect arguable discriminatiou again:st his black employees by 
adopting measurr;; that he knows will discriminate again:st his white 
emplo ·ees. 
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ployment in, any program established to provide appren-
ticeship or other training." 43 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (d). 
Equally suited to the task would be~ 703 (a) (2), which makes 
it uulawful for an employer to classify his employees "in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion. sex, or national origin." 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e-2 (a) (2).7 
Entirely consistent with these two express prohibitions is 
the language of § 703 (j) of Title VII, which provides that the 
Act .is not to be interpreted "to require any employer ... to 
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group 
because of the race ... of such individual or group" to correct 
a racial imbalance in the employer's work force. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2 (j).8 Seizing on the word "require," the Court 
1 Section 703 (a) (1) provides the third express prohibition in Title VII 
of Kaist>r':; di:>criminatory admiHSion quota: 
" It ~hall be an unlawful emplo~'ment practice for an employer-
"(1) to fail or refusP to hirP or to diHchargf' an individual, or othf'rwise 
to di:scriminate against any individual with respect to hi,; compensation, 
tPrm~, conditions, or privilf'geH of employment, bf'cause of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sf'x, or national origin .... " 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-
2 (a) (1) . 
8 The full text of § 703 (j), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j), provides as 
follows: 
"(j) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require 
any employer, employment ag<'nry, labor organiza1 ion, or joint labor-
managrment commit teP :subjrct to this subchapter to grant preferential 
trf'atmrnt to any individual or to nny group becnuse of the race, color, 
religion, ~('X, or national origin of such individual or group on account of 
an imbalancr which may exi:>t with respect to the total number or per-
rentage of per::;ons of any rnce, color, religion, sex, or national origin em-
ployrd by any employf'r, rPfened or classified for employment by any 
rmployment agency or labor organization, ad mitt f'd to membership or 
cla::;sifird by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any 
apprentice::;hip or other training program, in compari::;on with the total 
numhrr or percentage of llersom; of such race, color, rrligjon, sex, or na-
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"infers tl1at Congress must have intended to "permit" this type 
of racial discrimination. Not o1lly is this reading of § 703 ( j) 
outlandish in the light of the fiat prohibitions of ~~ 703 (a) 
and (d), but. as explain rei Part III, it is totally belied by the 
Act's legislative history. 
Quitc simply, Kaiser's racially discriminatory admission l 
quota is flatly prohibited by the plain language of T'itle VII. 
This normally d1sposi£ive fact." however. gives the Court only 
monwntary pause. An "interpretation" of the statute up-
holding Wt:>ber's claim would, according to the Court, "'bring 
about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the 
statute.'" Ante, at 6. quoting United States v. Public Util.,. 
ities Comm'n, 345 U. S. 295. 315 (1953). To support this 
conclusion. the Court cans upon the "spirit" of the Act. which 
1 t eli vines fro m~:::s:i-::n_,'rl'l'f!'I tr;l-:c' VrTTnfi•'='s.,l7e g=I::· sTI a::-;t~1 v::-::c-=-. ..,h~I=sto ry in eli-
eating that enactnwnt of the statute was prompted by Con-
gress' clt:>sire "to opcn employmmt opportunities for Negroes 
in occupations which [had] been traditionally closed to them." 
Ante, at 8, quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of 
Se11 . Humphrey).10 But the legislative history invoked by 
tiona! ori~ein in any rommnnit~·. Stnie, RrC'tion, or other arra, or in the 
availablr work forre in :ut~· rommnni1~·, Statr, section, or ethpr arrn." 
9 " lf tlw words arr plnin, thr~· givr nwaning to thP :wt, :mel it. i:-< n<>it.her 
the duty nor thr privilege of the courts to enter ~pcculati,·c fields in search 
of a diffrrPllt mranin~ . 
" .. . [Wlhen word~ are frE'e from doubt they must be takrn as the 
final exprr~~<ion of the IE'gislntive intrnt, and nrc not io br acldc·d io or 
subtractE'd from by conHiderntion;; drnwn ... from nn~· cxtrnneous source." 
Caminetti v. United States. 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) . 
1·0 In holding thnt Titlr VII eannot be intE'rprC'trcl to prohibit usc of 
Kni;;rr',; racinlly di~criminator~· ndmis;;ion quota, thr Court rrnsons that it 
would br "ironic" if a law in;;pired by thr hi;;tor~· of rncial di~criminntion 
in rmplo~·mrnt ngainst bbch forbndr rmployf'I'H from voluntnrily dis-
criminatillg against whitr~< in favor of black:-. I 10er no irony in a law 
that prohibits all volun1nry raeial discrimination, E'V<'ll discrimination di-
rectPcl a1 whit(•;; in favor of blacks. Thr evil inhrr<•n1 in discrimination 
ugaim;t N~>gro<'tl i::< that it ~" bm.;rd on nn ipnm,tnhle charnctrri;;tir, utt('rlf 
-?8-4;32, 18--435 & '18--436--Dlb'SENT 
STEELWORKERS v. WEBER 11 
the Court to avoid the plain la11guage of §§ 703 (a) and (d) 
simply misses the point. To be sure, the reality of employ-
ment discrimination against Nfgroes provided the primary 
impetus for passage of Title VII. But this fact by no means 
supports tho proposition that Congress intended to leave em-
ployers free to discriminate against white persons.11 In most 
irrPIPvant to rmploynwnt cl<'eision:oJ. ThP rharart<'ristie h<'rom<'s no lrss 
immutabiP and irrPirvnnt, nnd discrimination basrd thereon brromes no 
less rvil, simp!~· bN•ausr thr prrsm1 cxrluclcd is a membrr of one race 
rathrr than anoth(•r. Far from ironic, I find a prohibition on all prefrren-
tial trratmrn! ba:<('(l on racr as rlrmrn!ary and fundamental as the prinri-
plr that "two wrong~ do not makr a right." 
11 The onl,\' shred of lrgi~Jativ<' hi>'tor~· ritt•d h~· th<' Court in ~upport of 
t11(' proposition that "Congre~s did not intf'nd wholl~· to prohibit pri,·nte 
nncl vohmtar~· affirmative action effort~," ante, at R, is 111(' following <'X-
cerpt from the .Judiciary Committre Heport accompanying the civil rights 
bill rrportrd to thr Hons<': 
"No bill ran or should lay claim to eliminating all of tllC cnu e::; nnd 
con~equencrs of racial and other typrs of di::;rrimination against minori-
i ie . ThNr is reason to b<•li<'vr. howev<'r, that national leacler:-;hip pro-
vidrd hy the enaetmrnt of F<'deral legislation d!'tlling with thf' most 
troublesomr problems will create an atmosphere l'onducive to voluntary 01' 
local resolutiuu of other forms of discriminat:ion." H. R. Rrp. No. 914, 
88th Cong., 1st Se~,.:., 18 (196a) (hen•inafter H. R. R<'p.), quot<'d a.nte, at 
8. 
Thr Comt srizrs ou th<' ilalicizrd lnngnagr t·o ::;npport its ronrlu~ion that 
Congre~:'i did not intpncJ to prohibit volnntary impo~it ion of raciall~· dis-
criminator~· rmployment quota~. The Court. howPvrr, ~top,.: too ~hort in 
its rrading of tlw Hou~r Rrport . Thr words imm<'diatd~· following the 
matf•rial rxr<'rptrd by thp Court are as follow:<: 
"It is, howevN, poR~ihlr :md nPCrsRary for thr Congres~ to rnact lrgisla-
tion which prohibitR and providr~ t hr means of trrmina ting the most 
serious types of discrimination. This H. R. 7152, a,.: amendrd. would 
achieve in a numbf'r of rrlatrd nr<'as . It wonld rech1rf' disrriminntory 
obstacleH to thr rxc>rci;;r of til<' right io votr and providr mPans of <'Xprdit-
ing the vindication of that right. It would mak<' it po:<~iblr to rrmove 
thP daily affront and humiliation involvt>d in di>'rriminator~· drniaiH of 
accf'~s to faei lit it'~ ost msibly oprn to t hP gP1wral pub !if·. It would gua r-
nntec thai thrrr will bt' no di><eriminnt ion npon rcripirnf>< of Fcdrral 
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cases, tc r 11 egislative history ... is more vague than the statute 
we arc called upon to intcrpn't." United States v. Public 
Utilities Comm''ll, 345 U.S. 295. 321 (1054) (Jackson. J.. con-
curring). Here. ho\vever. the lcgislativr history of Title VII 
is as clear as the language' of~~ 703 (a) and (d). and it in'C'fut-
ably clrmonstratrs that C'ongrrss meant precisC'ly what it said 
in ~~ 703 (a) and (d)-that no racial discrimination in em-
ployment is pennissiblr under Title vn. not rven preferential 
treatment of minorities to correct racial imbalance. 
III 
In undrrtaking to rrvirw the kgislativc history of Title VII, 
I am mindful that my topic hardly makes for light reading, 
financial M.~iHtfllH' <' . It would prohibit di~rrimination in rmplo~·n1C'nt, and 
proYidr mpan~ to rxprditP trrmination of di~rrimination in puhlir rdura-
tion. It would OJWn additional avrnu<·~ to dPnl with rrdrrss of drnials 
of rqual protrction of tlw lawR on :wrount of rarr, color, rrligion, or lla-
tioual origin hy State or lorn! authorities." H. R. Rep., at 18 (rmpha~is 
addrcl). 
Whrn thu~ rrad in ront<•xt. the m<•aning of thr italirizrd language in 
thr Court 's rxcrrpt of tbr Hou~r RPport brromr~ r lrar. B~· draling with 
"the mo~t ,;eriouH typeH of di~rrimination," ~urh a~< di,;crimination in voting, 
)Jublic arrommodation;;, rmploymPnt, PI r., H. R. 7152 would hopd'ully 
inspi1•e "voluntary or Joe a! n·s<ilut.ion of otlwr form;.: of discrimination," 
thnt i ~. form~ othrr than di~l·riminntion in yofing, publir nccommodntion., 
emplo~·nwnt , rir . 
Onr rnn nl~o infrr from thr Houf'r Tit>port thnt 1hr .Tudiciar~' Com-
mittrc hopNl that fedPral legi:,;Jat ion would inspirr volunt n r~ · r limination 
of diRcriminat ion againRt minority group~ of hrr· t hnn t hosr protcrtt>d 
unc!Pr thr hill, JWrhap~ thr ngl'd nnd handicnpprd to namr ju~t two. In 
an~' evrnt , t hr Hou;.:r Hrport do<'~ not support tlw Comt '::; propoRition 
that CongrP::>s, ·hy banning raeial discrimination in rmploymcnt, intt>nd('d 
to prrmit racial diHcriminat ion in emplo~·mpn(. 
Thu~, cxaminat ion of the Hou~r .Tudiriary Committrr '~ report rrvrals 
that lhP Comt's intPrJH'Piatiorr of Titil' VII, far from being compt>lled 
b~, th1• Aet'~ kgi~lativt' histor~· , i~ utter!~· without support in that lrgisln-
tivc hi t>tory. Indeed, as demonstrated in Part III, infm. thr Court',; intrr-
pretation of Title VII is totally refu!Pd b~· thr Art ',., IPgislativc ·hi~tory. 
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but I am also fearful that nothing short of a thorough exami-
nation of the congressional debates will fully expose the mag-
nitude of the Court's misinterpretation of Congress' intent. 
A 
Introduced on the floor of the House of Representatives on 
June 20, 1963, the bill- H. R. 7152-that ultimately became 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contained no compulsory provi-
sions directed at private discrimination in employment. The 
bill was promptly referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, 
wherE> it was amended to include Title VII. With two ex-
ceptions, the bill reported by the House Judiciary Committee 
contained~§ 703 (a) and (d) as they were ultimately enacted. 
Amendments subsequently adopted on the House floor added 
§ 703's prohibition against sex discrimination and § 703 (d)'s 
coverage of "on the job training." 
After noting that "[tjhe purpose of [Title VII] is to elim-
inate ... discrimination in employment based on race, color, 
religion. or national origin." the Judiciary Committee's report 
simply paraphrased the provisions of Title VII without elab-
oration. H. R. Rep. No. 914. 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1963) 
(hereinafter H. R. Rep.). In a separate Minority Report, how-
ever, opponents of the measure on the Committee advanced a 
line of attack which was reiterated throughout the debates in 
both the House and Senate and which ultimately led to pas-
sage of ~ 703 (j). Noting that the word "discrimination" was 
nowhere defined in H. R. 7152, the Minority Report charged 
that the absence from Title VU of any reference to "racial im-
balance" was a "public relations" ruse and that "the adminis-
tration intends to rely upon its own construction of "discrimina-
tion ' as including the lack of racial balance .... " H. R. Rep., 
at 67-68. To demonstrate how the bill would operate in prac-
tice. the Minority Report posited a number of hypothetical 
Pmployment situations, concluc.lillg in each example that the 
employer "may be forced to hire according to race, to 'racially 
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balance' those who work for him in every job classification or 
be in violation of Federal law." !d., at 69 (emphasis in 
original) .12 
When H. R. 7152 reached the House floor, the opening 
speech in support of its passage was delivered by Represent-
ative Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and 
the Congressman respolJSible for introducing the legislation. 
A portion of that speech responded to criticism "seriously mis-
12 OJl(' example had partieulnr relevance to the instant caF<c: 
"Under thr power granted in this bill, if n. carpenters' hiring hall, say, had 
20 mrn awaiting call, tlw first 10 in seniority being white carpenters, the 
union could br forcrd to pass t hrm ovrr in favor of carpenters beneath 
them in seniority but of the stipulated race. And if thr union ro ·ter did 
not contain the names of thr earpenters of thr race needed to 'racia!l~r 
balance' the job, the union agent must, then, go to the street and recruit 
member~ of the stipulated race in sufficirnt number to comply with Fed-
em] ordNs. el~e hi8 Local could be held in violation of Federal law." H. R. 
Rep., at. 29. 
From this and other examples, the Minority Report concluded: "That 
this i~. in fact, a not too subtlr system of raeism-in-n'ver~e cannot be 
sueces,;t'ully drnircl." ld .. at 73. 
Obvious]~· responding to the ;\Iinority Report's charge thai federal 
agencie~, particularly the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), would equate "discrimination" with "racial imbalance," 1 he 
Tiepuhliean spon,.:ors of tlw bill on the Judiciary Committer l:i1ated in a 
separai (' i'Pporl: 
"It must also be l:Stres~ed that the Commil:S::;ion must confine its activities 
to correcting abu~e, not promoting <'quality with mathematical certainty. 
1n thi~ regard, nothing in the till<' permits a person to demand employ-
ment. . . . Internal affairs of rmployrrl:i and labor organizations must 
not bP interfern'd with exr<>pt to the limited extent that correction is re-
quired in discrimination practir<'~. It" primarr task is to make certain 
that tlw ehannels of employmrnt arc• open to person,.; regardless of their 
racr and 1 hat jobs in compani<'s or membership in 1m ions are strictly 
fill<'d on the ba~i,.; of qualification'' !d .. Part II, at 29. 
The R<'publican supporter~ of i he bill concluded their remarks on Title 
VII by declaring that "[a]ll wstigrs of inequality based solely on race 
must be removed .... " I d., ai 30. 
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representring] what the bill would do and grossly distort[ing] 
its effects": 
"[TJhe charge has been made that the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission to be established by title 
VII of the bill would have the power to prevent a busi-
ness from employing and promoting the people it wished, 
aud that a 'Federal inspC'ctor' could then order the hiring 
and promotion only of employees of certain races or reli-
gious groups. This description of the bill is entirely 
wrong .... 
"Even tf a] court could not order that any preference 
Lc given to any particular race, religion or other group. 
but would be limited to ordering an end of discrimination. 
The statement that a Federal inspector could order the 
employment and promotion only of members of a specific 
racial or religious group is therefore patently erroneous. 
" ... The Bill would do 110 more than prevent ... em-
ployC'rs from discrimi11ating against or -in favor of workers 
because of their race. religion. or national origin. 
"It is likevvise not true that the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission would have power to rectify exist-
ing 'racial or religious imbalancC'' in employment by 
requiring the hiring of certain people without regard to 
their qualifications simply because they are of a given 
race or religion. Only actual discrimination could be 
stopped." 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (emphasis added). 
Representative C'eller's construction of Title VII was repeated 
by srveral other supporters during the House dobate. 1:: 
1 ~ Hrprrsrntaih·o Lind~H .\' had ihi~ io sa.v: 
' ·Titi~ lcgishilion ... dors nol , a~ has brcn Sllgg!'Ht!'d hrrrlofon· boih on 
and off tlw Aoor, forcp nrrPpinnrr of prople in ... job;; ... hcrau~c they 
nrc Nrg.ro. It does not impos(' qnolas or any ~Jlrl'iaiJ1l'ivi lcgrs of seniority 
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Thus, the battle lines were drawn early in the legislative 
struggle over Title VII, with opponents of the measure charg-
ing that agencies of the federal government such as the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), by interpret-
ing tht> word "discrimination" to mean the existence of "racial 
imbalance," would "require" employers to grant preferential 
treatment to minorities, and supporters responding that the 
EEOC would be granted no such power and that, indeed, Title 
VII prohibits discrimination "in favor of workers because· of 
their race.'' Supporters of H. R. 7152 in the House ultimately 
prevailed by a vote of 290 to 130,11 and the measure was sent 
to the Senate to begin what became the longest debate in that 
body's history. 
or acceptance. TherP i:; nothing whatever in this bill about racial balance 
as appear,; so frequrntly in the minority report of 1 he Committee. 
" What the bill cloPs do is prohibit discrimination becau~e of race .... " 
110 Cong. Rcr. 1540 (1964). 
Represpntative MiniHh addrd: "Uuder title VII, employmrnt will be on 
the baHis of ml:'rit, not of fa('(' . This ml:'ans that no quota systl:'m will be 
set up, no on!:' will bl:' forced to hire incompl:'tent help because of race or 
religion, and no one will be given a ve~ted right to demand l:'mployment 
for certain jobs." ld ., at 1600. Representative Good!:'!!, answering the 
charge that Title VII would be iuterpreted "to requirr e] a racial balance," 
id., at 2557, responded: "There i;; nothing here as a mattPr of legislative 
history that would require racial balancing. . . . We are not talking about 
a union having to balancl:' it;; ml:'mbership or an employer having to 
balancr a number of employees. There is no quota involved. It is a 
matter of an individual's right~ having been violatPd, charges having 
bern brought, investigation carried out, and conciliation having been at-
tempted and then proof in court that there was discrimination and a denial 
of right>; on the basis of race or color." ld., at 2558. After H. R. 7152 
had been passed and 8ent to the Senate, Republican supporters of the 
bill in the Housr prepared an interpretative mrmorandum making clear 
that " title VII does not permit the ordering of racial quotas in bu~ine~s 
or unionti and does not permit interferences with seniority rights of em~ 
ployees or union memberti.'' ld., at 6566 (emphasis added) . 
u Eleven Members did not vote. 
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B 
The Senate debate was broken into three phases: the debate 
on sending the bill to Committee, the general debate on the 
bill prior to invocation of cloture, and the debate following 
cloture. 
1 
When debate on the motion to refer the bill to Committee 
opened, opponents of Title VII in the Senate immediately 
echoed the fears expressed by their counterparts in the House, 
as is demonstrated by the following colloquy between Senators 
Hill and Ervin: 
"Mr. ERVIN. I invite attention to ... Section [703 
(a)l .... 
"I ask the Senator from Alabama if the Commission 
could not tell an employer that he had too few employees, 
that he had limited his employment, and enter an order, 
under [Section 703 (a)], requiring him to hire more per-
sons, not because the employer thought he needed more 
persons, but because the Commission wanted to compel 
him to employ persons of a particular race. 
"Mr. HILL. The Senator is correct. That power is 
written into the bill. The employer could be forced to 
hire additional persons .... " 110 Cong. Rec. 4764 
( 1964) .15 
15 Continuing with thrir exchange, Senators Hill and Ervin broached 
the ~ubjrct of racial balance: 
"Mr. ERVIN. So if the Commissioner ... should be joined by another 
member of the Commis<ion in the finding that the Pmployer had too high 
a percentage, in the Commi~~ion's judgment, of pPr~on~ of the Caucasian 
race working in hi~ busine~:;, the~· cou ld makr the employer rither hirr, in 
addition to hi::; present employees, an extra numbrr of Negro employees, 
or compel him to fire Pmployers of the Caucasian mce in order to make a 
place for N rgro emplo~·er::;? 
"Mr. HILL. The Senator is correct, although the employrr might not 
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Senator Humphrey, perhaps the primary moving force behind 
H. R. 7152 in the Senate, was the first to state the proponents' 
understanding of Title VII. Responding to a political ad-
vertisement charging that federal agencies were at liberty to 
interpret the word "discrimination" in Title VII to require 
racial balance, Senator Humphrey stated: "[T]he meaning 
of racial or religious discrimiuation is perfectly clear .... 
[I] t means a distinction and treatment given to different in-
dividuals because of their different race, religion, or national 
origin." ld., at 5423.10 Stressing that Title VII "does not 
limit the employer's freedom to hire, fire, promote, or demote 
need the additional emplo~·eeR, and although they miglJt bring his business 
into bankruptcy." 110 Cong. Her. 4754 (1964). 
Thi;;; virw was reitemtecl b~ · S<'nator Hobert::;on: 
"It is contemplated by thiH title that the percentage of colored and white 
populatio11 in a comnmnit~· ~hall be in similar percentages in every busi-
ness e;:;tabli;:;hment that rmploys ov<'r 25 persons. Thus, if there were 
10,000 colorrd p<•rsons in n city and 15,000 whites, an employer with 25 em-
ployee~ would, in order to ovrrcome racial imbalance, he requirPd to ha.ve 
10 colored per~onnel and 15 white. And if by chance that employer had 
20 colon•d <'mplo~·ee~. he would havr to fire 10 of them in ordrr to rectify 
the sit uation , of cour~r, this work::; thP other way around where whites 
would br firrd." ld., at 5092. 
Srnator Humphrr~· intrrruptrd Senator Robertson's discussion, respond-
ing: "The bill does not require that at all. If it did, I would vote against 
it. . . . Tlwro is no prrcrntagr quota." Ibid. 
10 This view was reitrratrd two days later in tlw "Biparti~an Civil Rights 
Newsletter" cli~trihuted to the Senate on March 19 by ::;upporter~ of 
H. R '1152: 
"3. Defining discrimination: Critic,; of the civil rights bill hnve charged 
that the word "dJorrimination' i;; left undefined in tbr bill and therefore 
the door is open for interpretation of this term accordmg to 'whim or 
caprice.' .. . 
"There i;; no sound ba:;is for uncertainty about the meaning of discrimi-
nation in the contrxl of the civil right;; biU . It means a distinction in 
trratment givrn to different individuab becaw;e of their different race, 
religion, or natwnal origin.'' l 10 Cong. Rec. 7477 (1964). 
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for any reasons-or no reasons-so long as his action is not 
based on race," Senator Humphrey further stated that 
"nothing in the bill would permit any official or court to 
require any employer or labor union to give preferential 
treatment to any minority group." Ibid. 17 
After 17 days of debate the Senate voted to take up the bill 
directly, without referring it to a committee. !d., at 6455. 
Consequently, there is no Committee Report in the Senate. 
2 
Formal debate on the merits of H. R. 7152 began on March 
30, 1964. Supporters of the bill in the Senate had made 
elaborate preparations for this second round. Senator Hum-
phrey, the Majority Whip, and Senator Kuchel, the Minority 
Whip, were selected as the bipartisan floor managers on the 
entire civil rights bill. Responsibility for explaining and de-
fending each important title of the bill was placed on biparti-
san "captains." Senators Clark and Case were selected as the 
bipartisan captains responsible for Title VII. Vass, Title 
VII: Legislative History, 7 B. C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 431, 
444-445 ( 1966) (hereinafter Title VII: Legislative History). 
17 Earlier in the debate, Senator Humphrey had introduced a newspaper 
article quoting the answers of a Justice Department "rxpert" to the "ten 
most common objections to Title VII." Insofar as is pertinent here, the 
article otated: 
"Objection: The law would empower Federal 'inspectors' to require 
emplo~·er::; to hire b~r race. White JWople would be fired to make room 
for Negroes. Seniorit~· rights would be destro~·rd .... 
"Reply: The bill requireH no such thing. The five-member Equal 
Emplo)·ment Opportunity Commi:;sion that would be created would have 
no power:; to order anything .... 
" .. . The bill would not authorize anyone to order hiring or firing to 
achieve racial or religious balance. An employer will remain wholly free 
to hire on thr basi~ of hi~ needH nne! of the job candidate':; qualifications. 
What is prohibitrd is the refusal to birr someone becau~e of hiH race or 
religion . Similarly, the law will have no effect on union seniority rights." 
110 Cong Rer. 5094 (1964). 
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In the opening speech of tlw formal Senatr clebatr on the 
bill, Aenator Humphrey addressed the main concern of Title 
VII's opponents, advising that not only does Title VII not 
require use of racial quotas, 'it does not permit their use. 
"The truth," stated the .floor leader of the bill, "is that this 
title forbids discriminating against anyone on account of race. 
'rhis is the simple and complete truth about title VII." ~10 
Cong. Rec. 6549 (1964). Senator Humphrey continued: 
"Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this 
title, there is nothing in it that will give any power to the 
Commission or to any courts to require hiring, firing, or 
promotion of rmployees in order to meet a racial 'quota' 
or to achieve a certain racial balance. 
"That bugaboo has been brought up to dozen times; 
but it is nonexistent. In fact, the very opposite is true. 
Title VI I prohibits discrirnin4tion. In effect, it says that 
race, religion , and national origin are not to be used as 
the basis for hiring and firing. Title VII is designed to 
encouragP hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, 
not race or religion." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
At the close of his speech, Senator Humphrey returned briefly 
to the subject of employment quotas: "It is claimed that the 
bill would require racial quotas for all hiring, when in fact it 
provides that race shall not be a basis for making personnel 
decisions." I d., at 6553. 
Senator Kuchel delivered the second major speech in sup-
port of H. R. 7152. In addressing the concerns of the opposi-
tion , he observed that "[nlothing could be further from the 
truth " than the charge that "Federal inspectors" would be 
empowered under Title VII to dictate racial balance and pref-
erential advancement of minorities. I d., at 6563. Senator 
Kuchel emphasized that senority rights would in no way be 
affected by Title VII: "Employers and labor organizations 
could not discriminate in favor of or against a person because 
of his race, his religion , or his national origin, In such mat-
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ters ... the bill now before us ... is color-blind." I d., at 
6564 (emphasis added). 
A few days later the Senate's attention focused exclusively 
on Title VII, as Senators Clark and Case rose to discuss the 
title of H. R. 7152 on which they shared floor "captain" re-
sponsibilities. In an interpretative memorandum submitted 
jointly to the Senate, Senators Clark and Case took pains to 
refute the opposition's charge that Title VII would result in 
preferential treatment of minorities. Their words were clear 
and unequivocal: 
"There is no requirement in title VII that an employer 
maintain a racial balance in his work force. On the con-
trary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial bal-
ance, whatever such a balance may be, would involve a 
violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance 
would require an employer to hire or to refuse to hire on 
the basis of race. It must be emphasized that discrimina-
tion is prohibited as to any individual." I d., at 7213.18 
1 8 In obviouR rPference to the charge that the word "discrimination" in 
Titlr VII would be intPrprPted by federal agmcies to mPan the absence of 
racial halancP, thr intPrpretativr memorandum statPd: 
"fSection 70:3] prohibits discrimination in employment brcause of race, 
color, rrligion, ~rx, or national origin . It has be<"n suggPsted that the 
conrrp! of rli~crimination i~ vagur. In fact it i:; clear and simple and 
ha:; no hiddrn m<"aning::;. To di~criminate is to makr a distinction, to 
make :t differrnce in trrntment or favor, and tho:sr distinctions or differ-
enr<"S in treatment 01' favor which are prohibit€'d by fSrction 703] arc 
thoHr which are based on any five of thr forbiddrn critrria: race, color, 
rrligion, SPx, or national origin." 110 Cong. Rcc. 7213 (1964) (rmphasis 
add Pel). 
Earlirr in hi;; sprrch, Srnator Clark introducrd a memorandum pre-
pared at his requro;t hy thr Ju:sticr Department with tlw purpose of 
rc;-;pondmg to critici,.;m~ of Titlr VII lrvri<"d by opponents of thr mra~ure, 
part irularl~· S€'na tor Hill. With rega rrl to racial balan('f'. the Justice De-
partmrnt ~tated : 
"Finally, it has been as~rrted that title VII would impOR<' a rpquire-
mrn! for 'rarial .balance.' This i~ incorrect. TJ1erc is no provii:iion . .• 
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Of particular relevance to the instant case were their observa-
tions regarding seniority rights. As if directing their com-
ments at Brian Weber, the Senators said: 
"Title VII would have no effect on established seniority 
rights. lts effect is prospective and not retrospective. 
Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating 
in the past and as a result has an all-white working force, 
when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation 
would be simply to fill future vacancies 011 a nondiscrim-
inatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed per-
mitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to 
prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are 
hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense 
of the white workers hired earlier." Ibid. (emphasis 
added).19 
in title VII ... that requires or authorizes any Federal agency or Federal 
court to rPquire preferential treatment for an)· individual or any group 
for the purpo::>e of achieving racial balance. . . . No rmployer is re-
quirPd to maintain !Ill)' ratio of Negrors to whitPs. . . . On the contrary, 
any deliberate attempt to maintain a given balanrr would almost cer-
tainly run afoul of title VII becau::;e it would involve a failure or refusal 
to birr ~:;ome individual becau:-;e of hi~ race, color, religion. srx, or national 
origin. What title VII seeks to accomplish, what the civil right~:; bill 
seek:-; to accompli8h i::; equultreatment for ull." !d .. at 7207. 
10 A Ju::;tice Department memorandum earlier introduced by Senator 
Clark , Rec n. 18, supra. expre:;::;ecl the ~ame view regarding Title VII's 
impact on seniority right:; of employees: 
"Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it. 
take~ effect .... This would br true even in tht> ca:;e where owing to 
discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had 
more ~enioritr than Negroes. . . . [A]s:-;uming that seniority rights were 
built up ovPr a period of time during which N egroe:-: were not hired, the:;c 
right:-: would not be :>et a:;ide by the taking effect of title VII. Employers 
unci labor organizations would simply be undrr a duty not to di:-:criminate 
against Negroe:; because of their race." 110 Cong. Ree. 7207 (1964). 
Thr interpretation of Title VII contamecl in the memoranda introduced 
by Senator Clark totally refutes the Court's implied sugge~tion that 
Title Vli would prohibit an employer from cli::;criminating on the basis 
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Thus with virtual clairvoyance the Senate's leading sup-
porters of Title VII anticipated precisely the circumstances of 
this case and advised their colleagues that the type of minority 
preference employed by Kaiser would violate Title VII's ban 
on racial discrimination. To further accentuate the point, 
Senator Clark introduced another memorandum dealing with 
common criticisms of the bill, including the charge that racial 
quotas would be imposed under Title VII. The answer was 
of racP in order to maintain n racial balancP in hil'i work force, but would 
permit him to do so in order to achieve racial balance. Sec ante, at 13, 
:wd n. 7. 
Tlw maintain-achieve distinction i~ analytically indrfen~ible in any pvent. 
Apparently, the Court is saying that an employer i,.; free to achieve a 
raciall~· balanced work forrp by discriminating against. whitE's, but that 
onrP he has reached his goal, hP is no long freP to discriminate in ordpr 
to maintain that racial balancE'. In other words, once Kaiser rPachPs its 
goal of 39% minority representation in craft positions at thP Gramercy 
plant, it can no longer consider race in admitting Pmployees into its on-the-
job training programs, even if the program~ become as "all-white" as 
the) were in April 1974. 
Obviously, the Court is driven lo this illogical position by thr glaring 
statement, quotPd in text, of Senators Clark and Case that "any deliberate 
attempt to maintain a racial balance ... would involve a violation of Title 
VII because maintaining such a bnlancr would require an employer to hire 
or to refuse to hire on thr basi::; of race." 110 Cong. Rec. 7123 (1964) 
( emphasic added). Achieving a crrtain racial balance, however, no less 
t.han maintaining sueh a balance, would require an emplnyer to hire or to 
refuse to hire on thP basis of race. Further, the Court'" own conclusion 
that Title VII's legislative histor~', coupled with the wording of § 703 (j), 
evinces a congre::;sional intent to leavr employers free to employ "private, 
voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans," ante, at 12, is incon-
si~tpnt with itt> maintain-achieve di~tinction. If Congress' primary purpose 
in enarting Title VII was to open employment opportunities previously 
clc.,;ed to :'\fegroei:l, it would seem to make little difference whether the 
emplo~·er opening those opportunities w:>s arhieving or maintaining a cer-
tain rarial balance in his work force. Likewise, if ~ 703 (j) evinces Con-
gre::;s ' intent to permit Jmpo:;ition of race-conscious affirmative action plans, 
it would ~eem to makP little difference whether the plan was adopted to-
a<"hie,·c or maintain the deHirrd racial balance. 
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simple and to the point: 11Quotas are themselves discrimina-
tory." !d., at 7218. 
Despite these clear statements from the bill's leading and 
most knowledgeable proponents, the fears of the opponents 
were not put to rest. Senator Robertson reiterated the view 
that "discrimination" could be interpreted by a federal 
"bureaucrat" to require hiring quotas. !d., at 7418-7420.20 
Senators Smathers aud Sparkman, while conceding that Title 
VII does not in so many words require the use of hiring 
quotas, repeated the opposition's view that employers would 
be coerced to grant preferential hiring treatment to minorities 
by agencies of the Federal Government.21 Senator Williams 
was quick to respond: 
11Those opposed to H. R. 7152 should realize that to hire 
a Negro solely because he is a Negro is racial discrimina-
tion, just as much as a 'white only' employment policy. 
Both forms of discrimination are prohibited by title VII 
of this bill. The language of that title simply states that 
race is not a qualification for employment. . . . Some 
people charge that H. R. 7152 favors the Negro, at the 
expense of the white majority. But how can the Ian-
20 Senator Robertson's observations prompted Senator Humphrey to 
make the following offrr: "lf the Srnator can find in title VII ... any 
language which provides that an employer will ha.ve to hire on the basis 
of percentage or quota relaterl to color ... I will start eating the pages one 
after anothrr, brcatt~E' it is not in there ." 110 Cong. RPc . 7420 (1964) . 
21 R•Pfrrring to tilE' Equal Employment. Opportunity Commission, Sen. 
ator SmathPrs arguPd that Title VII "would makE> posHiblr thr creation 
of a Fedrntl hureaucracy which would , in the final analy~is, causE> a man 
to hirE> someone whom he did not want to hire, not on the basis of ability, 
but on tlw basis of rf'ligion , color, or creed .. .. " 110 Cong. Rec. 8500 
(1964). Senator Sparkman's comments were to thr samp effect. Sre 
n. 23, infra. Srveral othrr opponent;; of Titlr VII ('XprPss{'(l similar viPws. 
See 110 Cong. Rec . 9034-9035 (1974) (mnark~ of Srn~. Stennis and 
Tower), id., at 9943-9944 (remarks of Sens. Loug and Talmadge), id., at 
10513 (remarb of Sen. Robcrt~on). 
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guage of equality favor one race or one religion over 
another?' Equality can have only one meaning, and that 
meaning is self-evident to reasonable men. Those who 
say that equality means favoritism do violence to com-
mon sense." !d., at 8921. 
Senator Williams concluded his remarks by noting that Title 
VII's only purpose is "the elimination of racial and religious 
discrimination in employment." lbid. 22 On May 25, Sena-
tor Humphrey again took the floor to defend the bill against 
"the well-financed drive by certain opponents to confuse and 
mislead the American people." I d., at 11846. Turning once 
again to the issue of preferential treatment, Senator Hum-
phrey remained faithful to the view that he had repeatedly 
expressed: 
"The title does not provide that any preferential treat-
ment in employment shall be given to Negroes or to any 
other persons or groups. It does not provide that any 
quota systems may be established to maintain racial bal-
ance in employment. In fact, the title would prohibit 
preferential treatment for any particular group, and any 
person , whether or not a member of any minority group, 
would be permitted to file a complaint of discriminatory 
employment practices." Id., at 11848 (emphasis added). 
While the debate in the Senate raged, a bipartisan coalition 
under the leadership of Senators Dirksen, Mansfield, Hum-
phrey. and Kuchel was working with House leaders and rep-
resentatives of the Johnson Administrati011 on a number of 
amendments to H. R. 7152 designed to enhance its prospects 
of passage. The so-called "Dirksen-Ma11sfield" amendment 
22 Several other proponents of H. R . 7152 commented briefly on Title 
VII, ob~rrving that it did not authorizr t hr imposition of quotas to correct 
racial imbalaner. Sre 110 Cong. Rec . 9113 (1964) (remarks of Srn. 
KPating), id., at 9881-9882 (remarks of Sen . Allott) , id .. at 10520 (rr-
marks of Srn . Carl;,on) , id., at 11768 (rrmarks of Sen . McGovern). 
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wa · intruduc!'d on ~lay 20 by ~Pnator Dirksen as a suhstitut<> 
for tlw t•ntin• House-passed bill. The f'uhstitut<' bill, which 
ultimatt'ly lwcanH• law. l<'ft Utichangt•tl the basic· prohihitol'y 
langttal!<' of~~ 70:1 (a) and (d). as we•ll as tlw renwdial provi-
sions itt ~ 70() (g). ft added. howPvrr. S<'VPral provisions de-
filling UIHI elarifying tlw :·ii'OP<' of Titk VII's suhstantivp pr·o-
hibitiuns. One· of tho~w ('Lt rifying anwndments, ~ 7o:3 ( .i). was 
sp<'cifieally clin·ctcd Ht i h<' opposition'f' conct•rns rcganlillg 
raeial balaneinf.!; and prPf< 1 r• IJ tial tre>atnwnt of minoritiC's. pr·o-
viding in pertiti<'Ilt part: ":\uthing contained in I Title Vlll 
!'lhall tw intrrpr<'t.e·d to n·quin• any employc·r ... to grant 
prderrntial trratnwt1t to aii:V individual or to any group be-
causr of th<' raec· ... of ~:11('h individual or group on account 
of' a racial imbalance· in the• c•mployer's work force. 42 
l-. ~ . C. ~ :2000<'-:2 t.i); quotc•d in full. at 11.,. s·upra. 
Tlw Court draws from tlw languagP of ~ 70:3 (.i) primary 
support for its c:onelusion that Title VII's l.Jlanht prohibition 
on racial discrimitiatioJJ i·t c·mploym<'nt does not prohibit pref-
prcntial treatme•11t of bJa ;· ks to eorrPct racial illlbah.tnef'. Al-
h .. ging that O]J]lOIWnts of T it]<> \'ff had argUC'd (1) that t]w act 
would bP intc•rprrkd to n·quire <'lllployPrs with racially im-
balaiiC<'d work forec·s to g1.111t prd<'rential tr<'atmrllt to minor-
itirs and ( 2) that ' 'pJnp]t lY<'I'I' with racially iml.JalaJiced \Vork 
forces would gra 11 t prPfc•t 11 tial trratmf:'ll t to racial minoritiPs, 
even if 110t rc•quirc·d to do ~o by tht> .-\ct,'' ante, at D, the Court 
COIICludc•R that ~ 7o:3 C.i) is r<>sponsiv<' only to the oppotiPnts' 
first ol>jeetion and that Conl!:n'SR therefore• lllust have' intrnd<'cl 
to perlllit volu11tary. privatr discrimination against whitt's iu 
order to corrPct raeial iml>alaticc. 
Contrary to the Court's :111alysis. the languag<' of ~ 70:3 (j) 
is prc•cis<'ly tailorPd to th<' ob.i<•('tiotl voicrcl tinw a11d again hy 
Title VII 's opponc·titR. ~ ~ot OIIC<:> duri11g the 83 days of dehatc 
in tlw ~Pnatr did a S[Wak<•r. proponent or opponc·nt, suggPst 
that the hill would allci\\ cn1ployc•rs voluntarily to prdC'r raeial 
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minorities over white persons.23 In light of Title VII's flat 
prohibition on discrimination "against any individual ... 
because of such individual's race," § 703 (a), 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2 (a), such a contention would have been, in any 
23 The Court rites the rPmarb of St>nator Sparkman in support of its 
suggestion that opponents had argued that Pmployt>rs would take it upon 
tht>mst>lves to balance their work forces by granting preferential treatment 
to racial minorities. In fact, Senator Sparkman';,; comments accurately 
rt>flected tht> opposition's "party lint>." He argued that while the language 
of Title VII does not rxpressl~· rrquire imposition of racial quotas (no one, 
of course, lutd ever argued to thr contrary), the law would be applit>d by 
federal agencit>::; in ;,;uch a wn~· that "some kind of quota system will be 
m;rd." 110 Cong. Rec. 8619 (HJ64) . Srnator Sparkman';,; veiw is rrflected 
in thr following t>xrhangt> with Senator Stennis: 
"l'vir. SPARKMAN. At any rate, when the Governmrnt agent came 
to intervirw an employer wlw had 100 persons in his employ, thr first 
question would be, 'How many Nrgroe~ are you rmploying?' Suppose 
the population of that area was 20 peremt Negro. Irrunrdiately the agent 
would ~ay, 'You should h~ve at least 20 Negroes in your employ, and 
they should be distributed~ among your supervisory personnel and in all 
the other catrgories'; an the agent would insist that that be done 
immediately. 
"Mr. STENNIS . ... 
"The Senator from Alabama has made very clear his point about em-
ployment on the quota basi . Would not the same ba::;is be applied to 
promotions? 
"Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly it would . As I have said, when the 
Federal agcntR came to check on the situation in a small business which 
had 100 rmployrrs, and when thr agrnts said to the employer, 'Yon must 
hire 20 Negrors, and some of thE>m mu;,;t be E>mployed in supervisory ca-
paritir~, ' and ~o forth , and so on, the agent would also say, 'And you must 
promo1 E> thr Negroes, too, in order to distribute them evenly among 
the varimtH ranks of yom employees.'" !d., at 8618 (empha;;is added). 
Latrr in his rrmarb, Senator Sparkman stated: "Certainly thr suggestion 
will br made to a ;;nnall bnsinrs~ that may havE> a small govE>rnmE>nt con-
tract ... that if it doe~ not carry out the suggE>stion that has beE'n madr to 
thE' company by an in;,;pector, its Govrrnment contract will not be re-
nrwed." Ibid. Exct>pt for the Hizt> of thE' busine:,;s, Srnator Sparkman 
saw hiR prophecy fnlfillrd in this case. 
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event, too preposterous to warrant respouse. Indeed, speakers 
on both sides of the issue, as the legislative history makes 
clear, recognized that Title VII would tolerate no voluntary 
racial preference, whether in favor of blacks or whites. The 
complaint consistently voiced by the opponents was that Title 
VII, particularly the word "discrimination." would be inter-
preted by federal agencies such as the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission to require the correction of racial 
imbalance through the granting of preferential treatment to 
minorities. Verbal assurances that Title VII would not re-
quire-indeed, would not permit--preferential treatment of 
blacks having failed, supporters of H. R. 7152 responded by 
proposing an amendment carefully worded to meet, and put 
to rest, the opposition's charge. Indeed, unlike~~ 703 (a) and 
(d), which are by their terms directed at entities-e. g., em-
ployers, labor unions-whose actions are restricted by Title 
VII 's prohibitions, the language of § 703 (j) is specifically di-
rected at entities-federal agencies and courts-charged with 
the responsibility of interpreting Title VII's provisions. 24 
Iu light of the background and purpose of § 703 (j), the 
irony of invoking the section to justify the result in this case 
is obvious. The Court's frequent references to the "volun-
tary" nature of Kaiser's racially discriminatory admission 
quota bear no relationship to the facts of this case. Kaiser 
and the Steelworkers acted under pressure from an agency of 
the Federal Government, the Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance, which found that minorities were being "underuti-
lized" at Kaiser's plants. See Jl. 2, supra. That is, Kaiser's 
work force was racially imbalanced. Bowing to that pressure, 
Kaiser instituted an admissions quota preferring blacks over 
whites, thus confirming that the fears of Title VII 's opponents 
~ 1 Compare § 702 (a), 42 U. S. C. § 2000<'-2 (a) ("Ii Rhall br nn unlnw-
ful cmplo~·mrn1 practicf' for an employer . . . .") with § 70:3 (j) , 42 
F. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j) (''Nothing containC'd in this Hnbchapter shall be 
intrrpreted .... " ) . 
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were well founded. Today § 703 (j), adopted to allay those 
fears, is invoked by the Court to uphold imposition of a racial 
quote. m1der the very circumstances that the section was 
intended to prevent. 25 
Sect:on 703 ( j) apparently calmed the fears of most of the 
opponents; after its introduction complaints concerning racial 
balance and preferential treatment died down considerably. 20 
2 ~ In ~upport of its rending of § 703 (j), the Court argues thnt "a pro-
llibition again~t all voluntary, mcc-con~cious, affirmative action efforts 
would dioservP" the important policy, Pxpressed in the House Report on 
H . R . 7152, that Title VII lenve "management prProgatives nnd union 
freedoms ... undisturbed to the greatest extent po:ssible'' H. R. Rep., 
Part II, at 29, quoted ante, at 10. The Court thus conCludes that "Con-
gre:ss did not intend to limit traditional bu:siness freedom to such a degree 
as to prohibit all voluntnry, race-c<mscious affirmative action." Ante, 
at 11. 
The oentences in the House Report immediate>ly following the statemf'nt 
quoted by the Court, however, belie the Court':> conclusion: 
"Internnl affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be inter-
ferf'd with except to the limited extent that correction is required in dis-
crimination practices. Its primary task is to makf' certain that tlw chan-
uels of employment are open to per:sors regardless of their race and that 
jobs in companies or membership in unions arf' strictly filled on thf' basis 
of qualification.'' H. R. Rep., Part II, at 29 (Pmphnsis added). 
Thuo, the> Hou~e Report invoked b~· the Court is prefectly com;istent with 
the countless obsPrvations el::;ewherc in Title VII'o voluminous legi~lativc 
history that rmployero are free to make employmPnt dPci:sions without 
go··ernmental interference, so long as those decision:; arc made without 
regard to race. The whole purpooe of Titlf' VII waH to df'prive employers 
of their "traditional business freedom" to discriminate on the basis of 
race. In this case, the "channels of employment" at KaiRer were hardly 
"open " to Brian Weber. 
26 Some of the opponpnts still wen• not satisfied. For example, Senator 
Ervin of North Carolina continued to maintain that Title VII "would give 
the FPderal Government the power to go into any buoinPoi> or industry 
in the United Statei:i . .. and tell the opprator of that business whom he 
had to hirr." 110 CoDg. Rec. 1:3077 (1964). Senators R.u::;sell and Byrd 
remained of thP view that pre:ssures exerted by federal agencies would 
co111pPt elt1l)lO~"N::; .;to give .priot·it~· defiDitely and almo::>t completely, in 
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Proponents of the bill, however, continued to reassure the 
opposition that its concerns were unfounded. In a lengthy 
defense of the entire civil rights bill, Senator Muskie empha-
sized that the opposition's "torrent of words ... cannot obscure 
this basic, simple truth: Every American citizen has the right 
to equal treatment-not favored treatment, not complete 
individual equality-just equal treatment." 110 Collg. Rec. 
12614 (1964). With particular reference to Title VII. Sena-
tor Muskie noted that the measure "seeks to afford to all 
Americans equal opportunity in employment without discrim-
ination. Not equal pay, not 'racial balance.' Only equal 
opportunity." ld., at 12617.27 
Senator Saltonstall. Chairman of the Republican Confer-
eHce of Senators participa.ting in the drafting of the Dirksen-
Mansfield amendment, spoke at length on the substitute bill. 
He advised the Senate that the Dirksen-Mansneld substitute, 
which included § 703 (j), "provides no preferential treatment 
for any group of citizens. In fact, it specifically prohibits 
such treatment." ld., at 12691 (emphasis added).~8 
tnotit in~tnnce:;, to the members of the minority group." Jd., at 13149 
(remark~ of Sen. Bussell). 
27 Senator l\luskie also addres~ed the charge that federa l agencies would 
equate "di:;crimination," as that word is 11Hed in Title VII, with "racial 
balance": 
"Some of the opposition to t hi:; title has been based upon its alleged 
vaguene:;:; rand] it:; failurr to dt>finc ju~t what is meant by di~rrimi­
nation .... I submit that, on either count, the oppo:;ition is not well 
taken . Discrimination in thi,; bill means just what it mean;; anywhPrc: a 
diHtinrtion in treatmrnt given to differ<'Ilt individual,; brcm.ISP of their 
race ... and, a,; a practical matter , WP all know what con:;titutes racial 
di;,;rrimination ." 110 Con~. Bee. 12617 (1964). 
Srnator Mu~kie then revirwrd thP variou~ provisions of § 703, concluding 
that thr~· "provide a clear and definitivr indication of the typP of practice 
which this tit lr ;;eek:; to eliminatr. Any ~erious doubts concerning I Title 
VII'o] application would, it RePm~ to mr, stem at leaHt partially from the 
prediHpo~ition of the JWr~on expre:;;;ing ~ncb doubt." ld. , at 12618. 
28 The Court · tate~ that rongrrssional commrnts regarding § 703 (j) 
-
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On June 9, Senator Ervin ofi'ered an amendment that 
would entirely delete Title VII from the bill. In answer to 
Senator Ervin's contention that Title VII "would make the 
members of a particular race special favorites of the laws," 
id., at 13079, Senator Clark rE-torted: 
"The bill does not makE' anyone higher than anyone 
else. It establishes no quotas. It leaves an employer 
free to select whomever he wishes to employ .... 
"All this is subject to one qualification. and that quali· 
fication, is to state: 'In your activity as an employer ... 
you must not discriminate because of the color of a man's 
skin .... ' 
~~'fhat is all this provision does. . . . It nwrely says, 
'When you deal in interstate commerce, you must not dis· 
criminate on the basis of race .... '" !d., at 13080. 
The Ervin amendment was defeated. and the Senate turned 
its attention to an amendment proposed by Senator Cotton 
to limit application of Title VII to employers of at least 100 
employees. During the course of the Senate's deliberations on 
the amendment. Senator Cotton had a revealiug discussion 
with Senator Curtis. also an opponent of Title VII. Both 
men expressed dismay that Title VII would prohibit prefer· 
"werC' all lo thC' effPct tlwt rmployC'rs would not br required to in~.titute 
prrfprpntial (]uolas to avoid TitiP VII liabilit)·." Ante. at 11 n. 7 (Pm-
pha;;is in original). Senator Saltcustall's statrment that Title VII of the 
Dirk:-;en-Man;;firld f>Ubst itu1C', which rontained § 703 (j), "Hpecifically pro-
hibit ::;" prrferential treatment for any racial group di::;proves the Court's 
obsrrvation. Further, in a major statement. explaining thr purpose of the 
Dirben-:\Jansfield ;,;ubstitulC' ameudmC'nts, Senator HumJ)hre)' said of 
§ 70:~ (j): '' Thi~ ~ub:-;C'ct ion doC'~ not rrprC'sent any change in the substance 
of tlw titlP. It does state clear!)· and accurately what we havC' mpntioned 
all along about thr bill '::; intent and meaning." 110 Cong. Hec. 12723 
(1964). What Senator Humphrey had "mrntioned all along about the 
hiii'H intent and meaning," was that it neither requirPd no1' permitted 
impo::;ition of preferential quoins to eliminate racial imhalanres. 
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ential hiring of "members of a minority race in order to 
enhance their opportunity": 
"Mr. CURTIS. Ts it not the opinion of the Senator 
that any individuals who provide jobs for a class of peo-
ple who have perhaps not had sufficient opportunity for 
jobs should be commended rather than outlawed? 
"Mr. COTTON. Indeed it is." !d., at 13086.20 
20 The romjllei e exchange hei ween Senators Cotton and Curtis, insofar 
as is pert inrn t here, is a::; follows: 
" Mr. COTTO~ .... 
''I would a~::;ume that anyonr who will administrr the laws in future 
yrars will not di::;criminatr betwrrn the race;;. If I were a Nrgro, and by 
dint of rducation, training, and hard work I had ama::;. ed enough property 
a:; a regro ::;u that I had a bu::;ines.~ of my own-and thrr!' arr many of 
them in this countr~·-and I felt that, having made a succe;;;; of it myself, 
I wanted to help people of my own race to step up a~ I had :;tepprd up, 
I think I t>hould have thr right to do ,:o. I think I f'houlcl have the right 
to employ Negror,; in my own rstabli~hmen i and put out a lwlping hand 
to them if I :;o clr,;irPd. I do not belirve that anyone in Washington 
should be prrmittl'd to come in and Hay, 'You cannot employ all Negroes. 
You must have some Poles. You muHt have some Yankees.' ... 
"Mr. CURTIS .... 
"The Senator mad!' refrr!'nCP to the fact that a mrmber of a minority 
rae<" might brcome an employrr and :;boule! have a right to employ mem-
ber:; of his racr in order to givr them opportunit~· . Would not the same 
thing follow, that a membrr of n majority race might wi,;h to employ 
almo;;t entirely, or entirely , members of a minority race in order to cn-
hancr thrir opportunity? And is it not true that under title VII as 
written, that would ron~tiiute rli~;crimination? 
"Mr. COTTON .. . . 
" It crrtainly would, if ;;omronr complainrd about it and felt that he 
had bern deprived of a job, and that it had be('[) given to a membrr of a 
minorit r racr brcau,;e of his race aucl uot because of ~omr other rrason." 
110 Cong. Bee. 13086 (1964) . 
This rolloquy refuir:; thr Court'::; ~iutrment thai ·' [t]herr was no :;uggc;;-
tion aftrr the adoption of § 703 (j) that wholly voluntary, race-con:;cious 
affirmative action efforts would in them:;elves com;titutc a violation of 
Title VII .'' Ante, at J2 n . 7. 
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rrh us iu the only exchange on the Senate floor raising the pos-
sibility that an employer might wish to reserve jobs for minor-
ities in order to assist thrm in overcoming their employment 
disadvantage, both speakers concluded that Title VII pro-
hibits such. in the words of the Court, "voluntary, private, 
race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial 
segregation and hierarchy." Ante, at 9. Immediately after 
this discussion, both Senator Dirksen aud Senator Humphrey 
took the floor in defcuse of thP 25-employee limit contained 
in the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute bill, and neither Senator 
disputed the conclusions of Senators Cotton and Curtis. The 
Cotton amendment was defeated. 
3 
On June 10 the Senate1 for the second time in its history, 
imposed cloture on its membf'rs. The limited debate that 
followed centered on proposed amendments to the Dirksen-
Mansfield substitute. Of some 24 proposed amendments, 
only 5 were adopted. 
As the civil rights bill approached its final vote, several sup-
porters rose to urge its passage. Senator Muskie adverted 
briefly to the issue of preferential treatment: "It has been 
said that the bill discriminates against the Negro at the ex-
pense of the rest of us. lt seeks to do nothing more than to 
lift the Negro from the status of inequality to one of equality 
of treatment." 110 Cong. Rec. 14328 (1964) (emphasis 
added). Senator Moss in a speech delivered on the day that 
the civil rights bill was finally passed, had this to say about 
quotas : 
"The bill docs not accord to any citit~cn advantage or 
preference- it docs not fix quotas of employment or 
school population- it does force personal association. 
What it does is to prohibit public officials and those who 
invite the public generally to patronize their businesses 
or to apply for employrnent, to utilize the offensive, 
34 
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humiliating, and cruel practice of discrimination on the 
basis of race. In short, the bill does not accord special 
consideration; it establish<'s equality." I d., at 14484 
(emphasis added). 
Later that day, June 19. the issue was put to a vote, and the 
Dirksen-Mansfielcl substitute bill was passed. 
c 
The Act's return engagement in the House was brief. The 
Hous<' Committee on Rules reported the Senate version with-
out amendments on June 30, 1964. By a vote of 289 to 126, 
the House adopted House Resolution 789. thus agreeing to 
the Seuate's amendments of H. R. 7152.ao Later that same 
day, July 2, the Presiclen t signed the bill and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 became law. 
IV 
Reading the language of Title VII, as the Court purports 
to do, "agaiust the background of Lits] legislative history ... 
and the historical context from which the Act arose," ante, at 
6, oue is led inescapably to the conclusion that Congress fully 
understood what it was saying and meaut precisely what it 
said. Opponents of the civil rights bill did not argue that 
30 Only three Con~J:re::;smen Rpoke to the i::<Hue of racial quotas during the 
HouHe'" dt>bate on th() St>nate amendments. Hepre::;ent ative Lincl~ay 
Alated: ''LWJe wish to emphaRizr that this bill does not r('quire quohu;, 
racial balance, or an.\' of the other thing~ that tlw opponent~ have beeu 
~aying about. it." 110 Cong. Rec. 15876 (1964). Hrpn'sentative Mc-
Collngh crho<>d thi8 und<>r;-;tanding, n•marking that ''[t]he hill doe::; not 
permit the Fedcrnl Government to rPquire an emplo~·cr or union to hire 
or accPpt for membrr::;hip a quota for person::; from a particular minority 
group." /d., at 15H93. Th<> remarh of HeprP~rntativr 1IarGregor, 
quoted by the C'onrt, antP, at 12 n. 7, are singularly unhelpful. He merely 
uoted that by adding § 7G:3 (j) to Title VII of the HouHe bill, " I t]hc 
Sen at c ... :spelled out L the House's I intentions morE' specifically." /d.,. 
at 15893·, 
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employers would be permitted under Title VII voluntarily to 
grant preferential treatment to minorities to correct racial 
imbalance. The plain language of the statute too clearly 
prohibited such racial discrimination to admit of any doubt. 
They argued , tirelessly, that Title VII would be interpreted 
by federal agencies and their agents to require unwilling em-
ployers to racially balance their work forces by granting pref-
erential treatment to minorities. Supporters of H. R. 7152 
responded , equally tirelessly, that the Act would not be so 
interpreted because not only does it not require preferential 
treatment of minorities, it does not perrnit preferential treat-
ment of any race for any reason. It cannot be doubted that 
the proponents of Title VII understood the meaning of their 
words, for "[s]eldom has similar legislation been debated with 
greater consciousness for the need for 'legislative history' or 
with greater care in the making thereof. to guide the courts 
in interpreting and applying the law." Title VII: Legislative 
History, at 444. 
To put an end to the dispute, supporters of the civil rights 
bill drafted and introduced ~ 703 ( j). Specifically addressed 
to the opposition's charge, ~ 703 (.i) simply enjoins federal 
agencies and courts from interpreting Titl0 VII to require 
an em.11loyer to prefer certain racial groups to correct imbal-
ances in his work force. Th0 section says nothing about 
voluntary preferential treatment of minorities because such 
racial discrimination is plainly proscribed by ~ ~ 703 (a) and 
(d). Indeed, hacl Congress intended to except voluntary, 
race-co11scious preferential treatment from the blanket pro-
hibition on racial discrimination in ~~703(a) and (d), it 
surely could have drafted language better suited to the task 
than ~ 703 (j). ft knew how. Section 703 (i) provides: 
"Nothing contai11ed in I title VII] shall apply to any 
businrss or rnterprise on or near an Indian reservation 
with respect to any publicly announced employment 
practicr of such business or entprprisc under which a 
36 
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preferential treatment is given to any individual because 
he is an Indian living on or near a reservation." § 703 
(i), 42 U.S. C. § 2000e- 2 (i). 
v 
Our task in this case, like any other case involving the con-
struction of a statute. is to give effect to the intent of Con-
gress. To Jivine that iutent. we traditionally look first to the 
words of the statute and. if they are unclear. then to the 
statute 's legislative history. Finding the desired result hope-
lessly foreclosed by thesr conventional sources. the Court 
turns to a third source-the "spirit'' of the Act. But close 
examination of what the Court proffc>rs as the spirit of the Act 
reveals it as the spirit animating the present 1najority. not the 
Eighty-eighth Congress. For if the spirit of the Act eludes 
the cold words of the statute itself. it rings out with unmis-
takable clarity in the words of the elected representatives who 
made the Act law. Tt is equality. Renator Dirksen, I think, 
captured that spirit in a speech delivered on the floor of the 
Senate just moments beforr the bill was passed: 
'
1
[ T] oday we come to grips finally with a bill that 
a<.lvances the enjoyment of living; but. more than that, 
it advances the equality of opportunity. 
"I do not emphasize the word 1equality' standing by 
itself. It means equality of opportunity in the field of 
rclucation. Tt mean equality of opportunity in thP field 
of employment. It means equality of opportunity in the 
field of participation iu the affairs of government .... 
"That is it. 
"Equality of opportunity, if we are going to talk about 
conscienc('. is the mass conscience of mankind that speaks 
in every generation, and it will continue to speak long 
after we are dead and gone." 110 C'ong. Rec. 14510 
(1964) . 
There is perhaps no clevicr more destructive to the notion 
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of equality than the 11urnerus clausus-the quota. Whether 
described as "benign discrimination'' or "affirmative action," 
the racial quota is nonetheless a creator of castes, a two-edged 
sword that must demean one in order to prefer another. In 
passing Ti tie VII C'ongress outlawed all racial discrimination, 
recognizing that no discrimination based on race is benign, 
that no action disadvantaging a person because of his color is 
affirmative. With toclay's holding. the Court introduces into 
Titlt' VII a tolerance for the> very .evil that the law was in-
tended to eradicate. without offering even a clue as to v.·hat 
the limits on that tolerance may be. ·we are told simply that 
Kaiser's racial discriminatory admission quota "falls on the 
pcrmissiblP side of the line. ' ' Ante, at 12. By going not. 
merely beyond, but directly against Title VII's language and 
legislative history. the Court has sown the wind. Later courts 
will face tlw impossible task of reaping the whirlwind. 
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MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, concurring. 
While I share some of the misgivings expressed in MR. Jus-
TICE REHNQUIST's dissent, post, concerning the extent to 
which the legislative history of Title VII clearly supports the 
result the Court reaches today, I believe that additional con-
siderations, practical and equitable, only partially perceived, 
if perceived at all, by the 88th Congress, support the conclu-
sion reached by the Court today, and I therefore join its 
opinion as well as its judgment .. 
I 
In his dissent from the decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Wisdom pointed out 
that this case arises from a practica.l problem in the adminis-
tration of Title VII. The broad prohibition against discrimi-
nation places the employer and the union on what he accu-
rately described as a "high tightrope without a net beneath 
2 1 JU N 1979 
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them." 563 F. 2d 216, 230. If Title VII is read literally, on 
the one hand they face liability for past discrimination against 
blacks, and on the other they face liability to whites for any 
voluntary preferences adopted to mitigate the effects of prior 
discrimination against blacks. 
In this case, Kaiser denies prior discrimination but concedes 
that its past hiring practices may be subject to question. Al-
though the labor force in the Gramercy area was approxi-
mately 39% black, Kaiser's work force was less than 15% 
black, and its craft work force was less than 2% black. Kaiser 
had made some effort to recruit black painters, carpenters, 
insulators, and other craftsmen, but it continued to insist that , 
those hired have five years prior industrial experience, a re-
quirement that arguably was not sufficiently job-related to 
justify under Title VII any discriminatory impact it may have 
had. See Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 575 
F. 2d 1374, 1389 (CAS 1978), cert. denied, - U. S. -
(1979). The parties dispute the extent to which black crafts-
men were available in the local labor market. They agree, 
however, that after critical reviews from the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance. Kaiser and the Steelworkers established 
the training program in question here and modeled it along 
the lines of a Title VII consent decree later entered for the 
steel industry. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum In-
dustries, Inc., 517 F. 2d 826 (CA51976). Yet when they did 
this, respondent Weber sued, alleging that Title VII pro-
hibited the program because it discriminated against him as a 
white person and it was not supported by a prior judicial find-
ing of discrimination against blacks. 
Respondents' reading of Title VII. endorsed by the Court 
of Appeals, places voluntary compliance with Title VII in 
profound jeopardy. The only wa.y for the employer and the 
union to keep their footing on the "tightrope" it creates would 
be to eschew all forms of voluntary affirmative action. Even 
a whisper of emphasis on minority recruiting would be for-
bidden. Because Congress intended to encourage private 
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efforts to come into compliance with Title VII, see Alexander 
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,44 (1974) , Judge Wisdom 
concluded that employers and unions who had committed 
"arguable violations" of Title VII should be free to take rea-
sonable responses without fear of liability to whites. 563 
F. 2d, at 230. The United States takes a similar position 
here. Brief for United States 35. Preferential hiring along 
the lines of the Kaiser program is a reasonable response for 
the employer, whether or not a court, on these facts, could 
order the same step as a remedy. The company is able to 
avoid identifying victims of past discrimination , and so avoids 
claims for backpay that would inevitably follow a response 
limited to such victims. If past victims should be benefited 
by the program, however, the company mitigates its liability 
to those persons. Also, to the extent that Title VII liability 
is predicated on the effect of a.n employer's past hiring prac-~ 
tices, the program makes it less likely that a "dispara.te effect" 
could be demonstrated. Cf. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 
- U.S.-, -, 1979) (hiring could moot a past Title VII 
claim). And the Court has recently held that work force 
statistics resulting from private affirmative action were pro-
bative of benign intent in a "disparate treatment" case. 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 579~580 
(1978) . 
The "arguable violation" theory has a number of advan-
tages. It responds to a practical problem in the administra-; 
tion of Title VII not anticipated by Congress. It draws 
predictability from the outline of present law, and closely 
effectuates the purpose of the Act. Both Kaiser and the 
United States urge its adoption here. Because I agree that it 
is the soundest way to approach this case, my preference 
would be to resolve this litigation by applying it and holding 
that Kaiser's craft training program meets the requirement 
that voluntary affirmative action be a reasonable response 4> 
an "arguable Violation" of Title VII. 
78-432, 78-435 & 78-436-CONCUR 
4 STEELWORKERSv.WEBER 
II 
The Court, however, declines to consider the narrow "argu-
able violation" approach and adheres instead to an interpreta-
tion of Title VII that permits affirmative action by an em-
ployer whenever the job category in question is "traditionally 
segregated." Ante, at 13, and n. 9. The sources cited sug-
gest that the Court considers a job category to be "tradition-
ally segregated" when there has been a societal history of pur-
poseful exclusion of blacks from the job category, resulting in 
a persistent dispa.rity between the proportion of blacks in the 
labor force and the proportion of blacks among those who hold 
jobs within the category.* 
"Traditionally segregated job categories," where they exist, 
sweep far more broadly than the class of "arguable violations" 
of Title VII. The Court's expansive approach is somewhat 
*The jobs in question here include those of carpenter, electrician, gen-
eral repairman, insulator, machinist, and painter. App. 165. The sources 
cited, ante, at 2 n. 1, establish, for example, that although 11.7% of the 
United States population in 1970 wal:i black, the percentage of blacks 
among the mr<nbership of carpenters' unions waiS only 3.7%. - For painters, 
the percentage was 4.9, and for electricians, 2.6. United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights, The Challenge Ahead: Equal Opportunity in Re-
ferral Unions 274, 281 (1976). Kaiser's Director of Equal Opportunity 
Affairs testified that, as a result of discrimination in employment and 
training opportunity, blacks were underrepresented in skilled crafts "in 
every industry of the United States, and in every area of the United 
States." App. 90. While the parties dispute the cause of the relative 
underrepresentation of blacks in Kaiser's craft work force, the Court of 
Appeals indicated that it thought "the general lack of skills among avail-
able blacks" was responsible. 563 F. 2d, at 224 n. 13. There can be 
little doubt that any lack of skill has its roots m purposeful discrimination 
of the pas~, including segregated and inferior trade schools for blacks in 
Lou:siana, 'United States Commission on Civil Rights, 50 States Report 209 
(1961); traditionally all-white craft unions in that State, including the 
electrical workers and the plumbers, id., at 208; union nepotism, Local 53, 
Asbestos Workers v. Vogler , 407 F. 2d 1047 (CA5 1969); and segregated 
apprenticeship programs, R. Marshall and V. Br1ggs, The Negro and 
Apprenticeship 28 (1967). 
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disturbing for me because, as MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST points 
out, the Congress that passed Title VII probably thought it 
was adopting a principle of nondiscrimination that would 
apply to blacks and whites alike. While setting aside that 
principle can be justified where necessary to advance statu-
tory policy of encouraging reasouable responses as a form of 
voluntary compliance that mitigates "arguable violations," 
discarding the principle of nondiscrimination where no coun-
tervailing statutory policy exists appears to be at odds with 
the bargin struck when Title VII was enacted. 
A closer look at the problem, however, reveals that in each 
of the principal ways in which the Court's "traditionally segre-
gated job categories'' approach expands on the "arguable vio-
la.tions" theory, still other considerations point in favor of the 
broad standard adopted by the Court, and make it possible 
for me to conclude that the Court's reading of the statute is 
an acceptable one. 
A. The first point at which the Court departs from the 
"arguable violations" approach is that it measures an individ-
ual employer's capacity for affirmative action solely in terms 
of a statistical disparity. The individual employer need not 
have engaged in discriminatory practices in the past. While, 
under Title VII, a mere disparity may establish a prima facie 
case against an employer, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 
321,329- 331 (1977), it would not conclusively prove a viola-
tion of the Act. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 
339-340, n. 20 (1977); see§ 703 (j), 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e- 2 (j). 
As a practica.I matter, however, this difference may not be 
that great. While the "arguable violation" standard is con-
ceptually satisfying, in practice the emphasis would be on 
"ar11:uable" rather than on "violation." The grea.t difficulty 
in the District Court was that no one had any incentive to 
prove that Kaiser had violated the Act. Neither Kaiser nor 
the Steelworkers wanted to establiEh a past violation, nor did 
Weber. The blacks harmed had never sued and so had no 
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established representative. The Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission declined to intervene, and cannot be ex-
pected to intervene in every case of this nature. To make 
the "arguable violation" standard work, it would have to be 
set low enough to permit the employer to prove it without 
obligating himself to pay a damage award. The inevitable 
tendency would be to avoid hairsplitting litigation by simply 
concluding that a mere disparity between the racial composi-
tion of the employer's work force and the composition of the 
qualified local labor force would be an "arguable violation," 
even though actual liability could not be established on that 
basis alone, See Note. 57 N. C. L. Rev. 695, 714-719 (1979). 
B. The Court also departs from the "arguable violation" 
approach by permitting an employer to redress discrimination 
that lies wholly outside the bounds of Title VII. For exam-
ple, Title VII provides no remedy for pre-Act discrimination, 
Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U. S. 299, 
309-310 (1977); yet the purposeful discrimination that 
creates a "traditionally segregated job category" may have 
entirely predated the Act. More subtly, in assessing a prima 
facie case of Title VII liability, the composition of the em-
ployer's work force is compared to the composition of the poo1 
of workers who meet valid job qualifications. Hazelwood, 
433 U. S., at 308, and n. 13; Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U. S., at 339-340, and n. 20 (1977). When a "job category" 
is traditionally segregated. however, that pool will reflect the 
effects of segregation, and the Court's approach goes further 
and permits a comparison with the composition of the labor 
force as a whole, in which minorities are more heavily 
represented. 
Strong considerations of equity support an interpretation 
of Title VII that would permit private affirmative action to 
reach where Title VII itself does not. The bargain struck in 
1964 with the passage of Title VII guaranteeu equal oppor-
tunity for white and black alike, but wlwre Title VII provides 
78-432, 78-435 & 78-436-CONCUR 
STEELWORKERS v. WEBER 1 
no remedy for blacks, it should not be construed to foreclose 
private affirmative action from supplying relief. It seems 
unfair for respondent Weber to argue, as he does, that the 
asserted scarcity of black craftsmen in Louisiana, the product 
of historic discrimination, makes Kaiser's training program 
illegal because it ostensibly absolves Kaiser of all Title VII 
liability. Brief for Respondents 60. Absent compelling evi-
dence of legislative intent, I would not interpret Title VII 
itself as a means of "locking in" the effects of segregation 
for which Title VII provides no remedy. Such a construction, 
as the Court points out, ante, at 9, would be "ironic," given 
the broad remedial purposes of Title VII. 
The dissent, while it focuses more on what Title VII does 
not require than on what Title VII forbids, cites several pas-
sages that appear to express an intent to "lock in" minorities . 
In mining the legislative history anew, however, the dissent, 
in my view, fails to take proper account of our prior cases that 
have given that history a much more limited reading than 
that adopted by the dissent. For example, in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434-436, and n. 11 (1971) , the Court 
refused to give controlling weight to the memorandum of 
Senators Clark and Case which the dissent now finds so per-
suasive. See post, at 21-24. And in quoting a statement 
from that memorandum that an employer would not be "per-
mitted . .. to prefer Negroes for future vacancies/' post, at 
22, the dissent does not point out that the Court's opinion in 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 349-351 (1977) , 
implies that that language is limited to the protection of estab-
lished seniority systems. Here seniority is not in issue be-
cause the craft training program is new and does not involve 
an abrogation of pre-existing seniority rights. In short, the 
passages marshaled by the dissent are not so compelling as to 
merit the whip hand over the obvious equity of permitting 
employers to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination for 
which Title VII provides no direct relief. 
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III 
I also think it significant that, while the Court's opinion 
does not foreclose other forms of affirmative action, the Kaiser 
program it approves is a moderate one. ·The opinion notes 
that the program does not afford an absolute preference for 
blacks, and that it ends when the racial composition of Kai-
ser's craft work force matches the racial composition of the 
local population. It thus operates a.s a temporary tool for 
remedying past discrimination without attempting to "main-
tain" a previously achieved balance. See University of Cali-
fornia Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 342 n. 17 (1978) 
(BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). Be-
cause the duration of the program is finite, it perhaps will end 
even before the "stage of maturity when action along this line 
is no longer necessary." Id., at 403 (BLACKMUN, J.). And 
if the Court has misperceived the political will, it has the as-
surance that because the question is statutory Congress may 
set a different course if it so chooses. 
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.. Racial Quotas 
The Supreme Court approved on 
Wednesday the use of racial quotas 
by private employers to bring more 
blacks into skilled jobs. 
Minority groups were jubilant. 
NAACP Executive Director Benja-
min Hooks called the court's ruling 
"probably the most important civil-
rights decision in recent history." 
President Vilma S. Martinez of the 
Mexican-American Legal Defense 
and Educational Fund termed it tre-
mendous for Hispanics, "soon to be 
the nation's largest minority." A 
long list of would-be quota benefici-
aries lined up to applaud. 
The facts of this momentous ruling 
are simple. Kaiser Aluminum and 
Chemical Corporation agreed with 
. its union, the United Steelworkers of 
America, to reserve 50 percent of the 
openings in a training skills program 
for blacks. In the first year of the 
plan, Kaiser selected seven blacks 
and six whites for the program. The 
most junior black· selected had less 
seniority than several whites who . 
h~d been rejected, including one 
~rian Weber. 
So Weber brought suit, claiming 
reverse racial discrimination. The 
Supreme Court scotched his claim .. 
The law now is that private employ-
ers may "voluntarily" utilize "be-
nign" racial quotas more easily than 
universities supported by federal 
funds. 
~ 
;~ The tricky word in the court's lexi-
con is, of course, "voluntary." With 
the court's imprimatur now on racial 
quotas in the marketplace, employ-
ers are going to start feeling federal 
and minority pressures not so reacli-
ly characterized as "voluntary." 
The real question, however, is 
Brian Weber I 
I 
whether numerical quotas are the 
right way to overcome this nation's 
shameful legacy of racial discrimi-
nation. We believe they are not. 
For one thing, they breed hO":>lility. 
Whites rejected for employment or 
admission to a university tend to 
.blame that fact on special prefer-
ences for blacks. The racial resent-
ment generated will be just as 
unhealthy in the long run as that in-
flicted in the past by our indefensible 
segregation laws. 
For another thing, quotas tend to 
afflict minority achievement ~;th a 
presumption of charity. Some people 
always assume-wrongly-{hat the 
only reason this or that black person 
is in professional school or a top 
management post is because of ra-
cial preference. That is a racially de-
grading notion which quotas are only 
helping to perpetuate. 
Just who will benefit from quotas 
in' education or employment? 
Blacks? Hispanics? Women? Filipi-
nos? Chinese Americans? Irish 
Americans? Appalachian whites? It-
alian Americans? American Indi-
ans? Though this nation's wrongs 
against blacks are unique in severi-
ty, that will not stop others from 
pressing their claims. As a result of 
the court's ruling, we may anticipate 
a scramble for preferred status in 
which gracious losers will be few. 
Where quotas will leave notions of 
qualification and merit is difficult to 
say. But it is dangerous for a nation 
to assert that one's ethnic- or racial 
affiliation should eclipse individual 
merit. "In a society in which men 
and women expect to succeed by 
hard work and to better themselves 
by making themselves better, it is no 
trivial moral wrong to proceed sys-
tematically to defeat this expecta-
tion .... To reject an applicant who 
meets established, realistic, and un-
changed qualifications in favor of a 
less qualified candidate is morally 
wrong, and in the aggregate, practi- , 
cally disastrous." So wrote Yale law 
professor Alexander Bickel shortly 
before his death. 
Justice Lewis Powell suggested 
last summer in the Bakke case a far 
saner means of achieving an inte-
grated society than the one the court 
approved this week. Universities 
could acknowledge an individual's 
race or disadvantaged background in 
their decisions, said he, but not set 
aside a specified number of places 
on racial or ethnic grounds. 
May his advice yet be heeded. We 
shall not hear the last of this debate 
for a very long time. 
